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THE TOKYO CONVENTION ON OFFENSES AND CERTAIN
OTHER ACTS COMMITTED ON BOARD AIRCRAFT
BY ROBERT P. BOYLEt AND RoY PULSIFERt

I. INTRODUCTION

HE representatives of sixty-one1 governments participated in the drafting and enactment of the Convention on Offenses and Certain Other
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft at the International Conference on
T

Air Law convened at Tokyo in August-September 1963 under the auspices
of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), a specialized
agency of the United Nations. Sixteen of the States represented, including
the United States, caused the Convention to be signed by their delegations
at the conclusion of the Conference;' and it may be anticipated that these
governments will press for ratification in accordance with their respective
constitutional procedures. Article 21 of the Tokyo Convention provides
that it shall come into force and effect upon the deposit of twelve instruments of ratification. It is therefore likely that the Convention will not

long remain an inert document, a fate which has befallen other conventions dealing with international air law.
However, whether the Convention can be adjudged successful will depend not on its ratification by merely twelve or even sixteen States but
on the extent to which nations with important aviation interests ratify it.
Indeed if the countries which are the major providers of air transportation, or which generate or attract large amounts of air traffic, or whose
t Chief of the United States Delegation, Tokyo International Conference on Air Law, 1963;
principal United States representative, ICAO Legal Committee and Legal Sub-committees, 1956-63;
Chairman, ICAO Sub-committee on the Legal Status of the Aircraft, Montreal, 1962. Deputy Assistant Administrator for International Aviation Affairs, Federal Aviation Agency; formerly, General
Counsel, Civil Aeronautics Administration; Associate General Counsel, Federal Aviation Agency.
B.A., Williams, 1935; LL.B., Harvard, 1938. Member of the Oklahoma and District of Columbia
bars; member of the bar of the Supreme Court of the United' States.
itAttorney, Civil Aeronautics Board; formerly, Staff Adviser, Presidential Steering Committee
on United States International Air Transport Policy; Attorney Adviser, Federal Aviation Agency
and United States Interagency Group on International Aviation; Enforcement Officer, International
Air Transport Association. B.A., Columbia, 1953; LL.B., M.I.A., 1958. Member of the New York
bar.
Opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the
United States Government.
'Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Byelorussian S.S.R., Cambodia, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Federal
Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Holy See, Hungarian People's Republic,
India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Kuwait, Laos, Liberia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Polish People's Republic, Portugal,
Republic of China, Republic of Haiti, Republic of Korea, Republic of Mali, Republic of the Upper
Volta, Rumanian People's Republic, Senegal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukrainian S.S.R., Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland, United States of America, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia.
'Congo (Brazzaville), Federal Republic of Germany, Guatemala, Holy See, Indonesia, Italy,
Japan, Liberia, Panama, Philippines, Republic of China, Republic of the Upper Volta, Sweden,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, and Yugoslavia.
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geographic location is such that a heavy volume of flights traverse their

airspace, do not ratify the Convention, it can have only limited success
as an instrument of international legislation, and will join the ranks of
the several other aviation treaties which are in force between only a few
geographically isolated States.
The primary purpose of any multilateral agreement which, like the
Tokyo Convention, may be adhered to by any member State of the United
Nations or its specialized agencies, is to achieve world-wide uniformity of
law. To obtain the largest number of adherents, the terms of such a treaty
must not be fundamentally objectionable, and, in addition, each ratifying
nation must either consider that the Convention is necessary or at least a
positive contribution to international relationships among States. The
Tokyo Convention as a whole is not fundamentally objectionable to any
of the States, including those of the communist bloc countries, which
participated in the Tokyo Conference. Nor do the records of the Conference reveal that any portion of it is considered by any State to contain a
fatal flaw of sufficient magnitude to render the Convention unacceptable.
Therefore, the question of whether the Convention will be successful,
that is, whether it will be widely ratified by States, particularly by those
having important aviation interests, will depend on their assessment of
whether the Convention is necessary to international aviation and air law,
or whether, if it is not necessary, general foreign relations considerations
make ratification desirable.
States which are now examining the usefulness of the Convention as a
condition precedent to deciding upon ratification will enquire whether the
international uniformity of law achieved by the Convention is necessary.
They will undoubtedly ask whether international practice, in the form of
bipartite or multipartite ad hoc arrangements, as well as formal bilateral
agreements such as extradition treaties, have been capable of resolving
international problems of criminal jurisdiction, and the other matters
embraced by the Convention. If they conclude that such arrangements
and agreements have been sufficient as a practical matter, they will further
query whether the Convention offers a more efficient way of obtaining the
same result. In undertaking this inquiry such States will probably wish
to balance the desirable and positive aspects of the Convention against
those features which, while not fundamentally objectionable, are nevertheless not, from their point of view, positively desirable, or which do not
mesh well with national practice. This kind of weighing process may very
well determine whether several important nations, such as France, will
ratify the Convention. This is a difficult and complex process which depends in no small part on the past experience of individual States, and the
peculiarities of national jurisprudence, politics and social norms. Thus
different countries may reach different conclusions. It is perhaps an irony
that the compromises which States must make in order to achieve a multilateral convention of world-wide acceptability may be such that some
States will be forced to conclude that its positive value, measured against
the status quo, is negligible. But this is the price of international consensus.
The Tokyo Convention had its origin in a 1950 study project of the
ICAO Legal Committee. Upon this basic project, which was originally as

conceptually br9Ad ; its name, "The Legal Status of the Aircraft," were
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superimposed parts of a draft convention in being entitled "The Legal
Status of the Aircraft Commander." This article will deal with the process
by which ICAO formulated the draft convention, and the product resulting from this process, the Tokyo Convention itself. It will, first, examine
the genesis and definition of the Legal Committee's work on the "Legal
Status of the Aircraft" study project in the period 1950-1956 with emphasis on its evaluation of the need for, and scope of, a convention dealing
with the subject matter of the project. Second, with particular reference
to the role of the United States, it will trace the development of the main
features of the draft convention in the years between 1957 and 1962.
Finally, the article will present an analysis of the Tokyo Convention and,
in so doing, attempt an assessment of whether it constitutes a necessary
and desirable addition to world aviation law from the point of view of
both the United States and other nations.'

11.

GENESIS AND DEFINITION OF THE PROJECT

A. Legal Committee, Montreal, 1950
At the Sixth Session of the Legal Committee of ICAO, held at Montreal
during May and June of 1950, the Mexican Representative to the ICAO
Council, Dr. E. M. Loaeza, who at that time also represented Mexico on
the Legal Committee, proposed to the Legal Committee that its work program include the question of the "legal status of aircraft."' Without objection by any representative, the Legal Committee referred this topic to
an ad hoc Sub-committee established by it for the purpose of recommending to the full Committee on proposals relating to its work program
The Sub-committee, on June 17, 1950, recommended that a subject entitled "Legal Status of the Aircraft" be added to the work program. It
noted that "the addition of this topic has been advocated by Dr. Loaeza
and also by (Professor) John C. Cooper, Legal Adviser of IATA" and that
"such a study is not purely theoretical and presents many problems of considerable importance. The wording of many provisions of the Chicago Convention refers to 'aircraft' and places obligations and rights on 'aircraft.'
Dr. Loaeza has drawn the attention of the Air Transport Committee to the
interest of such a study in relation to the status and registration of aircraft
internationally owned or operated."

No other reasons for the inclusion of the item on the work program were
stated. The Sub-committee recommended that a rapporteur be appointed
to study the matter in its "various aspects"; and that the rapporteur be
furnished with information collected by the ICAO Secretariat and from
the International Law Association, including Professor Cooper's comprehensive study entitled, "Study on the Legal Status of Aircraft,"' which
was prepared for the Association.
a The United States publicly stated, through its ICAO Representative, that the draft convention
as formulated by the ICAO Legal Committee at Rome in 1962, is, as a whole, both "necessary and
desirable."
4
ICAO Document 7035-LC/128, p. 10.
'The Sub-committee consisted of Messrs. A. Garnault (France), Chairman; and C. Ganns
(Brazil), A. Ambrosini (Italy), R. 0. Wilberforce (United Kingdom) and R. E. Ewell (United
States), members.
6 op. cit., Annex I, "Report of the Ad Hoc Sub-committee on 'Work Program'," p. 26.
7

Prepared for the International Law Aisociation, Septqrnl.r, 1949, and reprinted in 17 J. Air

L. & Com. 292 (1950).
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The Sub-committee also recommended that the attention of the ICAO
Council be called to the fact that it had not instructed the Legal Committee concerning the draft convention on the "Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander" which had been submitted to the Council in 1947 by
an ad hoc legal committee of the Provisional International Civil Aviation
Organization (PICAO), predecessor of ICAO." This draft convention had
originally been placed on the work program of the Legal Committee at
its First Session in 1947, but at the Second Session, in 1948, the draft was
referred to the ICAO Council for the purpose of obtaining the comments
of the technical bodies of ICAO. Noting the receipt of a communication
from the International Federation of Airline Pilots' Associations (IFALPA)
to the effect that airline pilots should not, in the course of their flying
duties, have civil liability in monetary damages in excess of that of the
carrier, and that this should be a feature of any convention dealing with
the legal status of the aircraft, the Sub-committee recommended that a
rapporteur be appointed to consider modifications to the aircraft commander draft convention.
The Sub-committee concluded that both the "Legal Status of the Aircraft" and the "Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander" should be placed
on the work program of the Legal Committee, but that these should be
considered after topics already on the agenda; namely, Aerial Collisions
and revision of the Warsaw Convention. The full Committee thereupon
adopted these recommendations and in so doing appointed as rapporteurs
Dr. Loaeza (Mexico) for the "Legal Status of the Aircraft," and Mr. A.
Garnault (France) for the "Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander."
B. Work Of The Rapporteurs, 1951
The work of the rapporteurs was published in the minutes and documents of the Seventh Session of the ICAO Legal Committee,' but the
Seventh Session took no action other than to note their submission. In his
paper Dr. Loaeza stated that "the definition and delimitation, from a legal
point of view, of all the consequences of the juridical existence of an aircraft, are what constitute its legal status." He concluded that of the "many
questions relating to this subject, the following may deserve the attention
of the Committee for a preliminary study:
a) Need for a clear definition of what is meant by 'legal status of an aircraft';
b) Definition and delimitation, by an international unification of rules, of
the several relations of aircraft to:
(i) the State of registry,
(ii) other States,
(iii) parties having rights in the aircraft,
(iv) parties on board,
(v) other parties.

Dr. Loaeza suggested that the Legal Committee should decide "the scope
of future studies relating to the problem."
' This draft was a revision of one developed by the Comit6 International Technique d'Experts
Juridiques Aeriens (CITEJA) at Cairo in 1946. CITEJA had been studying the subject since 1926.
9lCAO Doc. 7157-LC/130, May 1951. Quotations are from theme reports and hence no individual citations will be given.
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Mr. Garnault's report on the "Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander"
reviewed comments received on the PICAO draft convention since 1947.
IFALPA favored the enactment of such a convention, while the International Air Transport Association (IATA) concluded that the experience of its members "has not revealed any practical need for the proposed
convention." The report noted that national legislations, taken together,
deal with the following subjects: "The necessity (for) an aircraft commander; his appointment and replacement in case he is unable to act; his
general responsibilities; his powers as the agent of the owner or operator,
including the limitations or the extensions of these powers; the maintenance of the documents carried in the aircraft; births, marriages (and)
deaths; customs, sanitary and other regulations; negligence or fault." The
rapporteur's conclusion was that "most of these matters are capable of
international solution, and this would, by facilitating the work of the
aircraft commander, have the effect of improving the conditions of air
transport. In particular it is essential to define clearly: (1) -the conditions
of appointment of an aircraft commander so that his capacity as commander may be recognized by all the Contracting States with the rights
and obligations attached to this capacity; and (2)-the rights and obligations to be recognized uniformly by all Contracting States as belonging
to an aircraft commander with their limitations and possible extentions."
Both rapporteurs reviewed previous studies on their respective subjects.
"The Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander" had been considered by the
Comite International Technique d'Experts Juridiques Aeriens (CITEJA)
since 1926; a draft convention was provisionally adopted in 1931 and
subsequent revisions were discussed until 1946; in 1947 the ad hoc legal
committee of PICAO developed a refined version of the draft convention
from the previous work of the CITEJA.
Dr. Loaeza noted that various previous studies relating to the legal
status of the aircraft had not treated the problem as a whole. His principal
reference was to Professor Cooper's comprehensive paper, infra. Because
this paper was apparently a principal factor in the decision to place the
topic on the Legal Committee's agenda, a brief comment concerning it is
in order.
C. The Cooper Paper
Professor Cooper's stated purpose was to define the status of the aircraft
in international air law for the Air Law Committee of the International
Law Association with a view to having the Association decide whether it
should reaffirm or amend the position it took as to civil and criminal jurisdiction at its Thirty-third Conference at Stockholm in 1924. It was the
conclusion of the paper that "aircraft, like vessels, and unlike railway trains
and automotive vehicles, now have the quality of legal quasi-personality in
public international law (described) as nationality, but that unlike vessels,
and like railway trains and automotive vehicles, are not yet considered as
having the quality of personal responsibility in private law. The legal status
of the aircraft is therefore sui generis and places them in a class apart from
other instrumentalities of commerce." It was submitted that "the acceptance into international air law of nationality of the aircraft" results in the
creation of three cognate problems, only one of which required solution
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by international legislation." This was "the question as to conflicts in the
competence and jurisdiction of the State of the flag of the aircraft and of
other States." Noting that "conflicts already exist between the statute
laws of certain States,"" Professor Cooper quoted approvingly from M.
Maurice Lemoine's dissertation that "the determination of the law applicable to events occurring and acts performed on board an aircraft is a
complex and difficult problem. It is only fragmentarily settled by positive
law and the different national systems do not furnish altogether consistent
solutions."" The text of that portion of the paper dealing with the question of jurisdiction does not further enquire into the need for international legislation on the subject.
The paper contains the text of the International Law Association's 1924
draft convention on civil and criminal jurisdiction. This proposes the
grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the State of registry of the aircraft,
although it vests concurrent jurisdiction in the State in the airspace of
which the aircraft is flying at the time the civil or criminal act occurs
under certain circumstances."
Various other proposals concerning the resolution of conflicts of competence and jurisdiction were gathered in the appendix to the paper. Among
" The other two relate to "whether the distinction between state and civil aircraft in the
Chicago Convention is sufficient"; and the "treatment to be accorded state aircraft when in foreign
territory." It was submitted that both problems were adequately dealt with by the Chicago Convention and international practice. Indeed, as to the former, Professor Cooper concluded "that the
solution there presented (i.e., the Chicago Convention) should be allowed to stand unless and until
international practice indicates that confusion has resulted" (italics supplied). It is interesting to
note that Professor Cooper nowhere asserted that conflicts of competence and jurisdiction had in
practice resulted in confusion.
" Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, p. 515.
"Maurice Lemoine, Trait6 de droit alrien, Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1957, p. 201. Also cited in the
paper as a general discussion of conflicts of law affecting aircraft is Fernand de Visscher, "Les Conflicts de lois en mati~re de droit a~rien," Hague, Academy of International Law, Recneil des cours,
vol. 48, 1934-I1, pp. 279-385.
"" ,(a) Civil jurisdiction
Article 1
"The airship which is above the open sea or such territory as is not under the sovereignty of
any State is subject to the laws and civil jurisdiction of the country of which it has the nationality.
Article 2
"A public airship which is above the territory of a foreign State remains under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the State of which it has the nationality.
"A private airship which is above the territory of a foreign State is subject to the laws and
jurisdiction of such State only in the following cases:
1. With regard to every breach of its laws for the public safety and its military and fiscal laws.
2. In case of a breach of its regulations concerning air navigation.
3. For all acts committed on board the airship and having effect on the territory of the said
State.
"In all other respects a private airship follows the laws and jurisdiction of the State of the flag.
"(b) Criminal Jurisdiction
Article 3
"If at the commencement or during the progress of any flight of any aircraft passing over any
State or States or their territorial waters or over the high seas without landing, any person on board
such aircraft commits any crime or misdemeanour, the person charged shall forthwith be arrested
if necessary. Such felony or misdemeanour may be inquired into and the accused tried and punished
in accordance with the rules given under Article 2. The State of the place where such aircraft lands
shall be bound to arrest the accused if necessary and to extradite him to the State which has jurisdiction over him.
Article 4
"Acts committed on board a private aircraft not in flight in a foreign State shall be subject to
the jurisdiction of such State, and any person or persons charged with the commission of such act
shall be tried and, if found guilty, punished according to the laws of such State." (The paper gives
the following citation for this text: International Laws Association, Report of the 33 Conference,
Stockholm, 1924, Sweet and Maxwell, 1925, pp. 117-118.)
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these were excerpts from the Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime of the Harvard Research in International Law which places
concurrent exclusive jurisdiction in the State over which the aircraft is
flying as to crimes occurring in whole or in part within its airspace; and
in the State of nationality of the aircraft, as to a crime committed in
whole or part on board the aircraft.
D. Sub-committee On The Legal Status Of The Aircraft, Montreal, 1954
On May 15, 1953, the Council of ICAO decided to place the "Legal
Status of Aircraft" agenda item on the current work program of the Legal
Committee. By this action the Council in effect directed the Legal Committee to begin active work on the subject. It is to be noted that the
Council's decision was not based on any finding that international legislation was required in any area embraced by the nebulously defined topic;
indeed it was still considered as a study project. The Council did not concurrently recommend any action concerning the "Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander" which, therefore, remained on the work program of
the Legal Committee as a dormant item.
Thus motivated, the Legal Committee established, at its Ninth Session,
in August-September 1953, a Sub-committee on the "Legal Status of Aircraft." The formation of the Sub-committee may be considered as the
initial step in the systematic study of the topic. Its first meetings occurred
during the Tenth Session of the Legal Committee in September, 1954. After
several exploratory sessions, the Sub-committee determined that it would
consider those occurrences or acts which arise most frequently on aircraft
"which would raise problems under the legal status of the aircraft." The
Sub-committee decided to give preliminary consideration to the problem
of what law does, or should, govern such occurrences or acts.
Seven types of acts were to be studied." Of these, two involved acts
which were crimes under the law of the State of registry and the State in
which the act occurred, or one but not both States; the other five involved
various civil matters such as contracts, torts and licensing requirements
under both the law of the State in which the aircraft is registered and the
territorial or subjacent State. The Sub-committee determined that these
acts should be studied in relation to "several sets of physical circumstances
in which the aircraft may be at the time of the act in question to determine the effect of such physical circumstances upon the question of what
is, or should be, the applicable law.'"" These circumstances were stated to be
the following:
14 LC/SC "Legal Status"; WD No. 14; April 20, 1956.
is There were:
(1) Acts which are crimes under the law of the State of registry of the aircraft and the
law of the State in which the act occurred.
(2) Acts which are crimes according to the law of the two States mentioned in (1) above.
(3) Acts for which a license is required by the law of either or both States described in (1),
such as sale and service of alcoholic beverages, sale and service of food, carriage of fire
arms, carriage and use of various types of drugs and medicines, etc.
(4) Acts which are tortious according to the law of either or both States described in (1)
above.
(5) Acts which constitute the formation of contracts according to the law of either or both
of the two States described in (1) above.
(6) Acts which constitute the execution, revocation, or modification of wills according to
the law of either or both States described in (1).
(7) Acts which affect the status of persons such as birth, death, marriage, etc.
16 LC/SC "Lesal Status"; supra note 14, at 2.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

(1) The aircraft is in transit non-stop in the airspace above the geographical
boundaries of a State other than the State of registry of the aircraft;
(2) the aircraft is in the airspace above the geographical boundaries of a
State other than the State of registry of the aircraft and a subsequent
landing is to be effected in that State;
(3) the aircraft is in the airspace above the geographical boundaries of a
State other than the State of registry of the aircraft but has made a
prior landing in such State;
(4) the aircraft is in the airspace above the geographical boundaries of a
State other than the State of registry of the aircraft but the aircraft has
made a prior landing in such State and a subsequent landing in such
State is intended;
(5) the aircraft is over the high seas; and
(6) the aircraft is on the ground at an airport in the State of registry of
the aircraft.
Several States volunteered to submit papers analyzing one or more of the
seven types of acts in relation to the six sets of circumstances.
The United States undertook to prepare a report on criminal acts; that
is, the first two types of acts to be studied by the Sub-committee. This
paper became the principal basis of further work on the subject because
the various areas involving civil, in contradistinction to criminal, matters
and jurisdictional questions related thereto were, as will be subsequently
developed, excluded from the scope of the study and the draft convention
when the latter came into being.
E. United States Paper
The paper presented by the United States examined in some detail the
bases for the exercise of penal jurisdiction and law as to aircraft.' It
enumerated five bases: First, because of the rule of international law that
each State has complete and absolute sovereignty over its airspace," s is the
principle that the laws and jurisdiction of the State in the territorial airspace of which the criminal act takes place should apply. Second, by
analogy to international maritime law, is the principle that the laws and
jurisdiction of the State in which the aircraft is registered should be
applicable at all times, or in any event when the aircraft is not in sovereign
airspace; i.e., when it is over the high seas or lands having no sovereignty.
Third is the principle that the jurisdiction and law of the State of which
the accused or the victim is a national should be applicable. The fourth
basis is that the State of first landing should apply its jurisdiction and law.
Fifth is the principle that the State from whence the aircraft last took
off should have jurisdiction and should apply its laws. Each of these bases,
the paper establishes in considerable detail, have found support from text
writers and in national practice. However, only the first two, the territorial
or subjacent State and the State of registry, are generally recognized as
proper and desirable by the text writers, and have found nearly unanimous acceptance in the practice of States. Each principle is analyzed in
accordance with the six factual circumstances, and the advantages and
disadvantages of each is weighed in terms of practicality, State and aviation
1 "A Study of the Jurisdiction and Law to be Applied to Crimes on Board Aircraft," submitted
to the Sub-committee by the United States Delegation on April 13, 1956.
"Art. 1 of the Convention of International Civil Aviation, 61 Stat. 1180 (1947).
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interests, and the probability of conflict between States adhering to different principles.
The paper then proceeds to discuss concurrent jurisdiction, that is to
say, a combination of some or all of the above bases of jurisdiction. Because this paper, and in particular that part dealing with concurrent jurisdiction, constituted the principal basis of further work on the subject of
the "Legal Status of Aircraft" within ICAO, the section dealing with con-

current jurisdiction is set forth in full.
"Concurrent Jurisdiction. Most of the previous proposals for concurrent
jurisdiction would confer it on only two States: the State of registry of the
aircraft and the State in whose airspace the alleged crime took place. One
proposal for concurrent jurisdiction, while including the above two States, has
gone further advocating presumptive jurisdiction in all States flown over
and in the State of landing and take-off. 9 These draft conventions differ in
their treatment of concurrent jurisdiction. It is the purpose of this section
of the study to consider some of the merits and demerits of such proposals
for multiple jurisdiction.
"As early as 1914, M. de Danilovics and M. de Szondy ° advocated concurrent jurisdiction over crimes on aircraft in foreign airspace. They believed
that if such jurisdiction were agreed upon, States must also accept the principle of non bis in idem, that one State will not prosecute a man for a crime
for which he has already been tried and punished or found innocent in another State. These two writers provided rules for several different situations.
The flag State was to have exclusive jurisdiction with respect to crimes over
the high seas and international territory. There was to be concurrent jurisdiction in the subjacent and registry States when the aircraft was over foreign
territory. If the act affected another aircraft, both States of the flag were to
have jurisdiction. No system of priorities was set out.
"If a concurrent jurisdictional scheme is included in an international convention it would seem fair to incorporate also a provision on non bis in idem.
The Harvard study group specifically rejected this course, however, in 1935,
being unwilling to require States whose nationals had been legally tried in
another country to give up their own right to exercise criminal jurisdiction.
In practice, most States do abide by this principle."
"In 1919, James Spaight3 ' also advocated concurrent jurisdiction in the
subjacent and registry States, the first of these States seized being competent
to prosecute. He believed concurrent jurisdiction was necessary to prevent
the criminal from escaping.
"At Budapest in 1930, the Comit6 Juridique adopted a system proposed by
de la Pradelle. Jurisdiction was given to both the State flown over and the
State of registry. The first of these States with actual control of the offender
would have prior right of jurisdiction.' Even without such a provision, the
State with custody would be in a position to exercise jurisdiction first. Like
the previous proposals de la Pradelle's fails to provide any solution to the
conflict raised by two or more States of competent jurisdiction seeking
extradition from a third State having custody of the accused.
" These proposals do not presume to exclude nationality of the person as a basis for the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction.
"P.
de Danilovics and U. de Szondy, Les Infractions i la loi ptnale commises a bord des
aeronefs, 14 Droit A~rien 402 (1914).
"1Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, supra note 11, at 613.
2 Spaight, Aircraft in Peace and the Law (1919).
'Fenston and De Saussure, Conflicts in the Competence and Jurisdiction of Courts of Different
States to Deal with Crimes Committed on Board Aircraft, 1 McGill L. J. 66, at 79; Meyer, Statutory Criminal Law of Germany, p. 79 (1947).
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"The 1935 Harvard Draft Convention on Criminal Jurisdiction would
vest jurisdiction in States over crimes committed within their airspace and
on aircraft which have their national character. The Drafters specifically
rejected any provision assigning priority to either State.
Art. 3. A State has jurisdiction with respect to any crime committed
inwhole or in part within its territory.
Art. 4. A State has jusisdiction with respect to any crime committed
inwhole or in part upon a public or private ship or aircraft
which has its national character.24
"Thus with respect to all crimes on aircraft regardless where they might be,
there would be two competent jurisdictions. Again the State with custody
would have power to ultimately decide where jurisdiction would be exercised.
This is also true of maritime law. Higgins and Colombos state that even today
in the maritime field there is no agreement on which State (littoral or registry) should have the right to exercise jurisdiction when a crime is committed
on board a ship in a foreign port and both States desire to prosecute." Since
we are dealing here with provisions for an international convention which is
to settle and regulate jurisdiction and applicable law it would seem wise to
provide for a solution to the conflict and not wait for one to grow up by
case law. There is little satisfaction in the adoption of a convention leading
to conflicts. Dr. Meyer proposed to give first opportunity to the subjacent
State, requiring it however to act within a certain time or forfeit its prior
right. M. Chauveau would give the first right to the registry State.
"When only two States are interested in prosecuting, the need to establish
a priority system is less than under a proposal such as that made by Mr. John
Cooper to the 1952 meeting of the International Law Association at Lucerne,
in which he advocates giving jurisdiction to the State of registry and presumptive jurisdiction to all States flown over, between and including the
State of take-off before the crime and the State of first landing after the
commission of the crime. Cooper expressed the belief that as a practical matter
the State of first landing would be the State most likely to exercise jurisdiction. A multitude of States are thus given jurisdiction (1) to ensure that
the accused will not escape justice, (2) to remedy the situation in which
it cannot be determined exactly in which State the crime was committed.
Dr. Meyer and M. Chauveau both think such an extension of jurisdiction
unnecessary. M. Chauveau raises as the two main objections eventual conflicts between the diverse competent jurisdictions and uncertainty as to the
governing law with the possibility that the same act may be legal or illegal
depending on the jurisdiction. Dr. Meyer argues further that the registry and
subjacent states are the only two states which have any "legal connection"
with an act committed on board an aircraft and that all the other states
flown over have no connection with such criminal acts."
"The difficulties of giving jurisdiction to take-off and landing States have
already been discussed but there are objections also to that part of the proposal
giving presumptive jurisdiction to all subjacent States."
"The method by which a subjacent State would acquire jurisdiction, under
Mr. Cooper's theory, even when there is no proof that the alleged crime
" Harvard Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, suftra note 11, at 480, 508.
"'Higgins and Colombos, International Law of the Sea (2nd ed. 1951), p. 225.
26 Report of the 45th Conference of the International Law Assoc. 129-134 (1952).
"7A possible analogy for this proposal may be found in certain statutes of a few states of the

United States which authorize any of the counties in which a crime may have occurred to prosecute,
when the locus of the crime within the state having such a statute cannot be ascertained. The state,
of course, has jurisdiction over the crime and the legislation deals only with the particular place
within the state in which the criminal may be tried. State v. MacDonald, 109 Wis. 506, 85 N.W.
502 (1901) and Watt v. People, 126 Ill. 9, 18 N.E. 340 (1888).
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actually took place there, is to "deem" that the commission of the act
occurred in the airspace of the prosecuting State. Thus, a prima facie case
of territorial jurisdiction is made out to be rebutted only by proof (which
would be given by defendant) that the act in fact took place elsewhere. If
defendant does produce such evidence, Mr. Cooper suggests there be extradition to the competent State-if, of course, the latter requests such action
and the case is covered by the governing extradition treaty." The above
procedure would seem to differ in some respects from the usual AngloAmerican practice, which places the burden of proof on the prosecution.
However, if the defendant can prove the act did not take place in the airspace of the State in which he is standing trial but cannot or will not show
where it did in fact occur, should the prosecuting State lose jurisdiction?
According to the territoriality principle of jurisdiction, it would. The State
of registry still is competent to exercise its jurisdiction if it so desires.
"Second, if Mr. Cooper's proposal were incorporated in a convention covering all crimes, since an act could be criminal in only some or one of the
States flown over, if the accused could not prove the occurrence of his act
in airspace where it was not criminal, he could be convicted and fined or
imprisoned by a State only indirectly affected by his conduct for an act
innocent (sic) where it took place. It is arguable that the same injustice could
occur if concurrent jurisdiction were limited to the registry State and the subjacent State in which the crime actually took place. For example, an act
might not be criminal in French territory where it occurred but might be
criminal under the United States law of registry. The State of registry
could prosecute the accused. But this is not an abuse of penal justice because
the registry State is very vitally affected by events taking place on its aircraft. Certainly a State in whose airspace the crime did not take place is
less affected.
"Another possible inequity may result from the varying degrees of punishment which can be meted out by different States for the same act. Again
the same problem arises under any type of concurrent jurisdictional scheme;
however, if the concurrent jurisdiction is in States directly injured by the
act, then the different degrees of punishment may be more justifiable. Each
injured State has a right to decide the amount of punishment necessary.
"Third, Mr. Cooper's proposal is subject to a similar objection raised with
respect to jurisdiction in the State of first landing, that is, the possible
jurisdictions are dependent upon the pilot's actions. This would not appear
to be a sound basis for determining criminal jurisdiction.
"Concurrent jurisdiction has been proposed in order to afford an opportunity to any State affected by crimes on aircraft to inflict a penalty for
violation of its laws and to ensure that no criminal goes unpunished. Concurrent jurisdiction should be conferred on a sufficient number of States to
achieve the above ends but should not be extended to States which have only
an indirect interest in prosecuting an offender. Granting of authority to a
large number of States will cause confusion as to the applicable law, and
such a grant might lead to conflicts over jurisdiction. Care must be exercised
in determining whether the State of registry and the subjacent State, chosen
2s Contrary

to the Stockholm proposal, Mr. Cooper does not propose to include a specific obli-

gation to extradite in his draft convention. He believes that extradition should continue to be
governed by individual treaties. This suggestion has merit, for the difficulties of securing agreement
on the terms of a multilateral extradition treaty have prevented adoption of one in the past and
might limit the number of nations adopting a convention on air crimes in which such a treaty
were incorporated. However, some provision for rapid arrest, other than through extradition proceedings should probably be made in order that the accused does not escape. It would be helpful
were this to be included within the convention itself, with a provision assuring that the legal rights
and normal proceedings of extradition will then follow.
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by the Harvard Draft, the extensive jurisdiction such as that proposed by Mr.
Cooper, or some other solution, will best satisfy the criteria expressed above.
In any case, the question of priority among competent States should be considered. Should the jurisdiction of one State be subordinate to the prompt
exercise of jurisdiction by another, or should the State with custody (be it
the State of registry, the subjacent State, or otherwise) have the final determination?"
F. Sub-committee On The Legal Status Of The Aircraft, Geneva, 1956
The first substantive work toward the development of a draft convention dealing with the subject matter of the United States paper was accomplished by the Sub-committee at a meeting held independently of the
Legal Committee in Geneva in the first half of September, 1956.9 The
Sub-committee met under instructions of the Tenth ICAO Assembly, the
Legal Commission of which had determined that "priority ought to be
accorded to the question of crimes committed on board aircraft and acts
for which a license is required by law." The Sub-committee, in accordance
with this directive, limited its study to the subject matter covered by the
United States paper, as well as acts for which a license was required insofar
as these were related to penal questions. Thus problems of a civil law
nature were excluded from the "Legal Status of the Aircraft" agenda item
and the purview of the Sub-committee." The Sub-committee also decided
to consider that portion of the Legal Committee agenda item entitled the
"Legal Status of the Aircraft Commander" insofar as it related to crimes
committed on board aircraft. This decision, which would ultimately cause
an amalgamation of parts of each of the two topics into one convention,
was taken because the Tenth ICAO Assembly had instructed the Legal
Committee to give active consideration to the latter item.
The Sub-committee also gave attention to the question of whether international legislation was required in respect to offenses committed on
aircraft. As has been demonstrated, no representative body within ICAO
had, until now, ever articulated detailed reasons establishing the need for
a convention. After due deliberation, the Sub-committee determined, with
some members dissenting, that such a convention was desirable for the
following reasons:
(1) "One characteristic of aviation is that aircraft fly over the high seas
or over areas having no territorial sovereign. While national laws of
some States confer jurisdiction on their courts to try offences committed
on aircraft during such flights, this was not the case in others, and there
was no internationally agreed system which would coordinate the exercise of national jurisdiction in such cases. Further, with (the) high
speed of modern aircraft and having regard to the great altitudes at
which they fly as well as other factors, such as meteorological conditions
and, in certain parts of the world, the fact that several States may be
overflown by aircraft within a small space of time, there could be
occasions when it would be impossible to establish the territory in which
"' The following summary of actions by the Sub-committee is taken from its report LC/SC
"Legal Status," WD No. 23, October 10, 1956. Quotations are from the report and hence individual
citations will not be given.
0 The Sub-committee, at this stage, did not consider that civil law questions would be permanently excluded. However, they were never again substantively considered and the Tokyo Convention does not deal with such matters except insofar as the aircraft commander is held harmless from
tortious liability.
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the aircraft was at the time a crime was committed on board. There
was, therefore, the possibility that in such a case, and in the absence of
an internationally recognized system with regard to exercise of national
jurisdiction, the offender may go unpunished.
(2) "National jurisdictions in respect of criminal acts are based on criteria
which are not uniform; for example, on nationality of the offender, or
nationality of the victim, on the locality where the offence was committed, or on nationality of the aircraft on which the crime occurred.
Thus, several States may claim jurisdiction over the same offence committed on board aircraft, in certain cases. Such conflict of jurisdictions
could be avoided only by international agreement.
(3) "The possibility that the same offence may be triable in different States
might result in the offender being punished more than once for the same
offence. This undesirable possibility could be avoided by a suitable provision in the Convention."
Regarding the scope of the Convention, the Sub-committee decided
that it should "apply to any act or omission by a person on board an aircraft which is punishable under penal law, and that no distinction should
be made between serious or minor offences; be limited to aircraft 'in
flight', the term to be later defined; be applicable only to persons, who,
having committed the offence, were on board at the time the act or omission claimed of occurred; and not apply to State aircraft." Moreover, the
Sub-committee generally agreed that "the aim of such a Convention should
not be to establish or create jurisdiction; on the contrary, the object of
the Convention would be the recognition, by international agreement, of
the competence of States to establish jurisdiction of their courts under
national laws." The Tokyo Convention, enacted seven years after these
decisions were made, adheres to these definitions of the scope of the proposed convention.
A majority of the Sub-committee determined that the draft convention
should take account of five bases of jurisdiction, namely, the State in
the territory or airspace of which the offense was committed; the State
of nationality of the aircraft; the State of first landing after the offense
was committed; the State of the nationality of the offender; and the "State
against the security, sovereignty or public credit3 ' of which the offense
was committed."
It was unable to agree whether the draft convention should establish
priorities of jurisdiction. Three distinct positions were presented: (1) that
there is no need to resolve conflicts of penal jurisdiction and, therefore,
there is no need for a system of priorities; (2) that there should be an
absolute and definitive system of priorities (of those advocating priorities
there was considerable support for the rule that the State of first landing
should have foremost priority); and, (3) the granting of priority only
to the State in the airspace of which the act or offense occurred, if known;
or, if unknown or not committed in the airspace of any State, then to
State of registry of the aircraft. The United States advocated the third
position; France, Spain and other civil law countries the second; the United
Kingdom, Sweden and numerous others the first. This argument continued
apace at all subsequent meetings of the Sub-committee and the full Legal
Committee, and even during the diplomatic conference which enacted the
Tokyo Convention.
31

"Public credit" refers to counterfeiting and falsification of public seals and the like.
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Those Sub-committee members who opposed a system of priorities did
so for three reasons: first, that priorities were unnecessary, however theoretically desirable they might be, because the resolution of jurisdictional
conflicts between two or more States is not peculiar to aviation, but was
a question of general application in the relations of States and, as such,
should be resolved, if at all, by a convention of general applicability;
second, that normal international processes, such as the use of extradition
treaties, can be used to resolve any such conflicts should they arise; and,
third, that, if the five bases of jurisdiction are set up as a priority system,
a number of States will find the convention unacceptable." Those favoring
a system of priority agreed that while conflicts of jurisdiction are not
peculiar to aviation, they are more likely to occur in international flight;
and that omission of such a system would detract very much from the
usefulness of the proposed convention and might, depending on the convention terms, add a conflicting international jurisdiction to already conflicting national jurisdictions.
Four separate systems of priority were studied by the Sub-committee.
A common feature of each was that a State does not have any obligation
to assume jurisdiction, but only to recognize the priority of jurisdiction
accorded to each State. It was generally agreed that in any system of
priority, "first priority for the exercise of jurisdiction shall belong to the
State against the security or 'public credit' of which, or against the person
whose sovereign, the offence was committed;" and that minor infractions
of "regulations pertaining to the aircraft" by passengers or crew might
be jurisdictionally cognizable only in the law of the State of the nationality
of the aircraft.
III.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRAFT CONVENTION

A. Proposals Of The United States, 1957-58
After six years of work, the 1956 Geneva Sub-committee had, in effect,

bogged down over the question of priorities of jurisdiction. Because of
this, and because a draft convention had not been produced, the full Legal
Committee, at its Tokyo meeting in September, 1957, considered devoting
the work of the next Sub-committee to a subject which had progressed
beyond the stage of theoretical debate, namely, to a further consideration
and refinement of the draft convention on aerial collisions. However, the
United States, through its Legal Committee representative, opposed this
action and was able to prevail upon a majority of the Legal Committee to
decide to schedule another meeting of the Legal Status Sub-committee in
1958. Upon the return to Washington of the United States Legal Committee delegation, it was decided that the United States should prepare a draft
convention for use by the 1958 Sub-committee for the purpose of expediting ICAO action toward the development of a convention.
The United States draft was submitted to ICAO on August 14, 1958,
2 The United States was particularly concerned

that if the State of first landing became the

jurisdiction of first priority, there would be circumstances when that State would have to assume
extraterritorial jurisdiction without any connection between the act and the prosecuting State.
This would have rendered the convention unacceptable to the United States.
83 This decision was taken by the United States Air Coordinating Committee. The Committee
was composed of representatives of the Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, Defense, Army,
Navy, Air Force, the Civil Aeronautics Board, and the Civil Aeronautics Administration.
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prior to the meeting of the Sub-committee?' Because the Sub-committee
used this draft as the basis for its deliberations and derived its own draft
therefrom, the United States draft may be regarded as the precursor of
the first ICAO draft.
In presenting its draft the United States noted that the 1956 Subcommittee's decision to give concurrent recognition to five jurisdictions
would result in conflicts of jurisdiction which could best be resolved by a
system of priorities. To avoid the "troublesome" problem of a system of
priorities, the United States proposed, following maritime legal principles,
to vest the State of nationality of the aircraft with "extensive" jurisdiction, "by borrowing from the experience gained by the United States and
many other nations' members of ICAO in the status of forces arrangements in effect between many such States." Thus, under the status of
forces agreements, "where concurrent jurisdiction exists between one or
more States, one such State is given the primary right to exercise jurisdiction whenever in view of the circumstances of the offense that State has
the paramount interest. Accordingly, in the draft convention a condition
of concurrent jurisdiction is created but potential conflict is resolved by
providing for one State to have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction
when the circumstances are such that the interests of that State are paramount. There is no compulsion on the State having such primary right to
exercise jurisdiction, and provision is made for it to waive its jurisdiction
in favor of other States having concurrent jurisdiction in appropriate
cases." The United States draft convention recognized four bases of concurrent jurisdiction: (1) the territorial or airspace State; (2) the State of
registration of the aircraft; (3) the "State whose national security is violated, or against the person of whose sovereign the offense is committed";
and (4) the "State of the suspected offender's nationality." Primary jurisdiction is reserved to the State in the airspace of which the offense was
committed only if the suspected offender or victim is a national of that
State, or if the offense is directed against the national security or sovereignty of that State. Otherwise, primary jurisdiction is vested in the State in
which the aircraft is registered. The draft further provides that "sympathetic consideration" shall be given to any state having concurrent jurisdiction for waiver of primary jurisdiction.
This jurisdictional solution was not accepted by those Sub-committee
members advocating a definitive system of priorities, and particularly by
those who desired the State of first landing to be the State having first priority. Nor did it find favor with members opposed to any system of priorities.
The United States draft convention was made applicable to civil aircraft "from the moment power is applied for the purpose of actual takeoff until the moment when the landing run ends," a formulation, derived
from the language contained in annexes to the Chicago Convention, that
was to survive all subsequent ICAO drafts. The Tokyo Convention itself
applies only to aircraft registered in a contracting State which are not used
in military, customs or police services "while that aircraft is in flight or
on the
surface of the high seas or of any other area outside the territory of
4
3 LC/SC "Legal Status" WD No. 33, August 8, 1958. The paper was developed in the United
States Air Coordinating Committee. Quotations are from the paper and hence no individual citations will be given.
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any State," and defines the term "inflight" almost identically to the
formulation proposed by the United States. The draft was made applicable
to offenses punishable under the penal laws of the four States having
jurisdiction. There was a provision against double jeopardy or ne bis in
idem; this survived in principle until the Tokyo Conference where it was
excluded from the final text of the Convention. The articles of the draft
relating to the rights and duties of the aircraft commander, evidence,
restraint, and delivery and custody of offenders or suspects were retained
in principle in all successive ICAO drafts, and in the Tokyo Convention.
B. Sub-committee On The Legal Status Of The Aircraft, Montreal, 1958
The first draft convention on offenses, criminal jurisdiction and the
rights and duties of the aircraft commander to be developed within ICAO
was produced by the Legal Status of the Aircraft Sub-committee in
Montreal between September 9 and 20, 1958.' Prior to developing its
draft from that submitted by the United States, the Sub-committee again
examined the need for the Convention. Professor Cooper, whose paper it
will be recalled sparked the original action on the subject in ICAO in 1950,
now stated, in his capacity as IATA observer, that IATA Legal Committee
studies, based on the actual experience of scheduled international air transport operators, indicated that the conclusion of an international convention on the subject was not warranted. Nevertheless, IFALPA and the
International Law Association continued to support work on such a convention. After due deliberation the Sub-committee stated that such a convention was needed for several reasons, of which the following were
articulated: (1) "the lack of an international rule concerning extra-

territorial jurisdiction of a State in regard to offenses committed on aircraft of its nationality engaged in international air navigation; (2) problems of conflict of criminal jurisdictions, and the need to define the powers
of the aircraft commander to take necessary measures in respect of acts
on board endangering the safety of flight and for the preservation of order
over the passengers on board." The Sub-committee rejected a motion to
merely formulate a statement of principles to be recommended to States
for adoption in the form of national legislation. The draft propounded by
the Sub-committee did not incorporate the United States proposals concerning primary and concurrent jurisdiction for the stated reason that
such a solution would, on the one hand, require the State assigned primary
jurisdiction to exercise it in order to punish the offender, and, on the other
hand, require other States to renounce jurisdiction. But the Sub-committee
also rejected any system of priorities, even if there were no requirement
that States would be obliged to exercise jurisdiction. The disadvantages of
such a system were said to be that a "State having a low priority would
be obliged, even though it had custody of the offender, to refrain from
exercising jurisdiction until all other States having higher priority took
decisions not to exercise their jurisdictions, and that there would be consequential delay in finally bringing the offender to trial"; and that "a
system of priorities, to be efficiently workable, may need a coordinated
network of extradition arrangements amongst all the States concerned."
" The following is derived from the Report of the Sub-committee, LC/SC "Legal Status" No.
63, September 20, 1958. Quotations are from the Report and hence individual citations will not
be given.
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The Sub-committee therefore developed a third approach in its draft
by which the State of registration of the aircraft is declared to be competent to exercise its jurisdiction, such jurisdiction not being, however, exclusive. Indeed, all other bases of jurisdiction as set forth in national laws
remain as concurrent, although outside, that is, independent of, the Convention. Nevertheless, the exercise of jurisdiction by States in the airspace
of which the offense was committed is limited to four specific cases, namely,
if the offense affects the State's territory, if it has been committed by or
against a national of such State, if the offense involves a breach of flight
rules, and "if the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of any obligation of such State under an international agreement."
The Sub-committee further decided that no State should be obliged to
exercise jurisdiction.
In developing draft articles dealing with the powers and duties of the
aircraft commander, the Sub-committee stated that it was guided by considerations relating to the safety of the aircraft. It was "considered important that there should be internationally adopted rules which would enable
aircraft commanders to maintain order on board, whether in respect to
offenses or of any acts endangering safety of the aircraft or persons or
goods on board an aircraft engaged in international navigation." It was
also decided to protect the aircraft commander from criminal and civil
liability when acting pursuant to such rules. Thus was articulated for the
first time a theme which would subsequently become dominant: that the
Convention should have, as a principal purpose, the enhancement of safety.
From this was developed the scope of the Convention, as ultimately signed
at Tokyo, that the Convention shall apply to "offenses against penal law"
and "acts which, whether or not they are offenses, may or do jeopardize
safety . ..."
Other principles in the draft, subsequently retained in succeeding drafts
and ultimately adopted at Tokyo in 1963, relate to the delivery by the
aircraft commander of a suspected offender or dangerous person, the obligation of a contracting State to take such a person into custody under
certain circumstances, and those relating to the collection of evidence by
the aircraft commander.
C. Legal Committee, Munich, 1959
At its Twelfth Session at Munich in August 1959, the full Legal Committee undertook a substantive consideration of the agenda item entitled
the "Legal Status of the Aircraft," and the draft convention developed by

the Legal Status Sub-committee. ' The Committee reviewed the question
of whether an international agreement on the subject of offenses committed on aircraft was necessary or desirable. It concluded that it was in
agreement with the views of the Sub-committee on this matter, "taking
into account, in particular, the disparity in the provisions of various national laws related to such matters, the lack in several instances of a law
equivalent in the case of aircraft to the rule of international law relating
to the application of the law of the flag in the case of ships, and the de3 The following is derived from the Report of the Legal Committee, Twelfth Session; quotations
are from the Report and will not be individually cited. Because many of the principal State representatives of the Legal Committee also served on the Sub-committee, there was considerable continuity between the two bodies.
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sirability of unification of certain rules on the subject." The Committee
also agreed with the Sub-committee that the draft convention should "not
deal with incidents on aircraft giving rise to problems of civil law, e.g.,
contracts, torts, marriages, births, and deaths, and that it should deal with
the power of the aircraft commander." The Committee indicated that
civil law questions relating to the legal status of the aircraft and other
questions relating to the draft convention on the legal status of the aircraft commander could be examined subsequent to the completion of the
pending draft convention.
In examining the Sub-committee's draft, the Committee determined
that it would retain the jurisdictional rule that the State in which the
aircraft is registered is competent to exercise jurisdiction over offenses
committed on board the aircraft, but that such a rule would be "without
prejudice to other grounds or bases of jurisdiction; e.g., the jurisdiction of
the State in whose territory the aircraft was at the time of the offense, or
that of the State of which the offender or the victim was a national, or
that of the State whose national security was affected by the offense, and
perhaps some others. . . ." The Committee noted that the rule as formulated
was a separate question from, and did not affect, "the entitlement of the
State of registry to refrain from actually exercising it in any given case."
The Committee was unable to decide whether the State would be obliged
to "ensure that its national laws make its authorities" competent to exercise jurisdiction. The Tokyo Convention provides that each contracting
State "shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction as the State of registration."
The proponents and opponents of a system of priorities of jurisdiction
again engaged in extensive debate during the Committee's deliberations.
The proponents asserted that the resolution of conflicts of jurisdiction was
the very raison d'etre of the draft convention insofar as it dealt with
criminal jurisdiction. The opponents, who were in the majority, contended that the Convention should not go beyond recognizing the juris-

diction of the State of registration, and to limiting the jurisdiction of the
State in the airspace of which the act occurred to certain limited circum-

stances. The latter argued that a system of priorities could not be worked
out except in combination with "an extensive network of extradition
arrangements"; and that problems of conflict beyond that of the State of
registration and the airspace State are no way peculiar to aviation and
therefore "might well be left to be solved under any general system relating to conflict of criminal jurisdiction that might possibly be evolved in
the future." Meanwhile, because of the formulation decided upon, all
other bases of national jurisdiction remained unaffected by, and therefore
outside of, the draft convention.
The Committee's formulation for limiting the jurisdiction of the State
overflown is as follows:
"The criminal jurisdiction of a State in whose airspace the offense was
committed, if such State is not the State of registration of the aircraft or
the State where the aircraft lands, shall not be exercised in connection with
any offense committed on an aircraft in flight, except in the following cases:
(a) if the offense has effect on the territory of such State;
(b) if the offense has been committed by or against a national of such State;
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(c) if the offense is against the national security of such State;
(d) if the offense consists of a breach of any rules and regulations relating
to the flight and manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such State;
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of
any obligation of such State under an international agreement."
It was noted that this limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction "goes
somewhat beyond that contained in Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone formulated at
Geneva on April 29, 1958, concerning the restrictions on the criminal
jurisdiction of the coastal State in relation to offenses on board a foreign
ship passing through the territorial sea of that State."

The Committee carefully examined the conditions of the applicability
of the draft convention. Its formulation, utilized by the Tokyo Convention, is that the Convention should apply to "aircraft in flight,.... in flight"
being defined in accordance with the original United States proposal. This
formulation, the Committee noted, does not affect "the territorial jurisdiction of the State .

.

. in respect of any offense committed on a foreign

aircraft while the aircraft is at rest or is moving on the ground for taxiing
or for any other purpose than for actual take-off." As well, the draft convention as revised by the Committee would not apply where an offense is
committed on board while the aircraft is "in the airspace of the State of
its registration, except when the last place of departure was outside that

State or its next landing, or a subsequent landing with the offender still
on board, is made at a place outside that State; or over the high seas or
any other area outside the territory of any State unless the last place of
departure or the next landing is outside the State of registration." These
latter limitations survived, in modified form, all subsequent drafts, but
were not made part of the Tokyo Convention.
Careful attention was given to that part of the draft convention dealing
with the powers and duties of the aircraft commander. Having in mind
that the aircraft commander will not normally have legal training, the
Committee formulated his powers in relation to acts which are "prejudicial
to the safety of the aircraft or persons or property therein or to good order
and discipline on board." In respect to such acts the aircraft commander
may impose necessary measures of restraint on the actor, and may require
or authorize other members of the crew to do the same. He could similarly
authorize passengers. After landing, the commander is entitled to disembark any person who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed on board a "serious offense" or an act prejudicial to safety. No
obligation attaches to the State in which the actor has been disembarked.
In addition, the commander may deliver the actor to the authorities of
the State in which the aircraft first lands after the commission of the act
" Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
provides:
"The criminal jurisdiction of the coastal State should not be exercised on board a foreign ship
passing through the territorial sea to arrest any person or to conduct any investigation in connection
with any crime committed on board the ship during its passage, save only in the following cases:
(a) If the consequences of the crime extend to the control State; or
(b) If the crime is of a kind to disturb the peace of the country or the good order of the
territorial sea; or
(c) If the assistance of the local authorities has been requested by the captain of the ship or
by the Consul of the country whose flag the ship flies; or
(d) If it is necessary for the suppression of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs."
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if he has reason to believe a "serious offense" has been committed. The
receiving State is then to deal with the alleged offender in accordance with
its laws; the only obligation is to notify certain other States. The draft
convention also requires the aircraft commander to hand over all evidence to the receiving State, in the case of delivery, which is lawfully in
his possession in accordance with the law of the State of registry. Last, the
commander is required to report any action taken pursuant to the Convention, and must notify the State in which the aircraft lands of an apparent offense or act prejudicial to safety. The aircraft commander is fully
protected against criminal, civil, and administrative liability if he imposes
reasonable restraint or undertakes other reasonable action pursuant to the
draft convention. The Committee considered, but was unable to formulate
any acceptable rule concerning, the effect of aircraft registered in one
State and operated under bare-hull charter by nationals of another State.
In reviewing its revision of the draft convention, the Committee stated
that further study was required. For this reason it requested ICAO member States and international organizations to submit comments on the
provisional draft it had developed.
D. United States Comments On The Munich Draft Convention
In response to the request of ICAO for comments on the draft convention prepared by the 1959 Munich Legal Committee, the United States
declared that the "draft convention should be limited to making more
definite and certain the application of criminal law to events occurring
aboard aircraft which endanger the safety of the aircraft or persons and
property on board and ensuring authority in the aircraft commander to
deal appropriately with such acts." 8 Specifically, the United States proposed that only offenses which jeopardize safety should be made cognizable
under the convention and that therefore it should not refer broadly to
"penal offenses."
It was also urged that the draft convention should provide for a system
of priority between "the State of registration of the aircraft on which the
offense is committed and the State in whose airspace the offense is committed, these being the two States primarily concerned." Such a limited
system of priority, the United States contended, would "afford an effective solution" to the most usual type of conflict of jurisdiction; in the
absence of such a solution "the rationale of the convention . . . will
be seriously prejudiced." The solution proposed by the Committee at
Munich (namely, to limit the jurisdiction of the territorial State under
certain circumstances) the United States regarded as "an important curtailment of the traditional jurisdiction of States over crimes committed
intheir airspace" both in theory and in fact. The comment reiterated the
United States position expressed at Munich that the draft convention
should contain an article "to the effect that (1) nothing in the Convention shall be deemed to create a right to request extradition of any person
and (2) the term 'jurisdiction' in any arrangements respecting extradition
between (contracting) States ...shall, with respect to an offense to which
the Convention applies, be taken to include (the jurisdiction of the State
of registration of the aircraft)." These proposals were subsequently adopta Letter of the United States Representative to ICAO to the Council, dated May 12, 1961.

Quotations are taken

from that letter and therefore individual citations will not be given.

TOKYO CONVENTION

ed by the Legal Committee and at Tokyo, and may be found in Article
16 of the Tokyo Convention.
E. United States Hijacking Proposal
On March 2, 1962, the United States filed with the Secretary General of
ICAO, for consideration by the next session of the Sub-committee on the
Legal Status of the Aircraft, a proposal to incorporate in the draft convention an additional article dealing with forceable seizure of aircraft or
"hijacking." The paper submitted in support of the proposal states that it
was motivated by "the rash of hijacking incidents (which occurred) in
quick succession in 1961," and that its purpose is to deter hijacking incidents." It asserts that the draft convention is an appropriate vehicle to
enact international legislation dealing with hijacking because such incidents affect the safety of flight and normally involve a criminal act under
national law. It was noted that such incidents characteristically involve
the removal of an aircraft, by violent seizure or threat thereof, to a jurisdiction other than the State in which it is registered. The paper states that
the Convention on the High Seas, signed at Geneva on April 29, 1958,
although Article 15 thereof defines "piracy" to include aircraft as well as
ships, is of limited value because the acts proscribed must occur on or over
the high seas, thus excluding seizure of aircraft in sovereign airspace; and
because acts committed by the crew or passenger against persons or property on the same aircraft would appear to be excluded. The United States
proposal was subsequently adopted in principle by the Legal Committee
at its Rome meeting in 1962, and is contained in Chapter IV of the Tokyo
Convention.
F. Sub-committee On The Legal Status Of The Aircraft, Montreal, 1962
The Sub-committee on the Legal Status of the Aircraft met at Montreal
in March-April 1962 to review the comments of States on the Munich
draft of the Convention and to recommend further revisions to the text,
or to formulate questions, for the consideration of the full Legal Committee.'
The Sub-committee devoted considerable efforts to analyzing and recommending changes in the articles of the Munich draft dealing with the
geographical scope of the draft convention. This problem was solved at
the Tokyo Conference by eliminating the complicated categories of geographic application of the Convention altogether. Similarly, a great deal

of effort was spent in redrafting the article which makes the draft convention applicable only to civil, and not State, aircraft. A solution to this
very difficult and complex drafting problem was achieved in the Tokyo
Convention through the device of adopting the substance of the Chicago
Convention formulation. While that formulation is not free from am-

biguity, it has not presented serious problems in practice.
The Sub-committee asked the Legal Committee to decide whether the
draft convention should continue to be limited to offenses and acts committed by persons on board the aircraft or "whether the draft convention
" In 1961 the United States adopted domestic legislation which treats acts of hijacking as
"piracy." 72 Stat. 784, as amended by 75 Stat. 466, 76 Stat. 150, 76 Stat. 921; 49 U.S.C. 1472.
" This section is derived from the Report of the Committee, LC/Working Draft No. 662,
April 17, 1962. Quotations are taken from the Report and therefore individual citations will not
be given.
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should be extended to include offenses or acts occurring on board the
aircraft while their author was not on board; e.g., a person who sent a
package containing a time bomb." These and other similar questions were
certified for consideration by the Legal Committee. The Tokyo Convention is limited to offenses and acts committed by a person on board.
The most important work of the Sub-committee related to the jurisdictional articles of the draft convention. It was recommended that Article
2 of the Munich draft be deleted because of the changes recommended in
Article 3. Article 2 provided that "Offenses, for the purposes of this Convention, are offenses punishable by the penal laws of a Contracting State
competent in accordance with Article 3." The changes recommended to
Article 3 are substantially identical to Articles 3 and 4 of the Tokyo Convention. The following comparative text will make the changes clear:

Text of the Munich draft convention
Article 2
Offences, for the purpose of this
Convention, are offences punishable
by the penal laws of a Contracting
State competent in accordance with
Article 3.
Article 3
1. Independently of any other applicable jurisdiction, the State of
registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over
offences committed on board the aircraft.
2. The criminal jurisdiction of a
State in whose airspace the offence
was committed, if such State is not
the State of registration of the aircraft or the State where the aircraft
lands, shall not be exercised in connection with any offence committed
on an aircraft in flight, except in
the following cases:
(a) if the offence has effect on the
territory of such State;
(b) if the offence has been committed by or against a national
of such State;
(c) if the offence is against the national security of such State;
(d) if the offence consists of a
breach of any rules and regulations relating to the flight and
manoeuvre of aircraft in force
in such State;
(e) if the exercise of jurisdiction is
necessary to ensure the observ-

Text of redraft proposed
by the Subcommittee
(Montreal, March-April 1962)
Article 2
Deleted.

Article 3
1. The State of registration of the
aircraft is competent to exercise
jurisdiction over offences committed
on board the aircraft.
2. The State in whose airspace the
offence was committed, if such State
is not the State of registration of
the aircraft, may not compel the aircraft to land in order to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction, except in the
following cases:
(a) No change
(b) No change
(c) No change
(d) No change

(e) No change

TOKYO CONVENTION

ance of any obligation of such
State under an international

agreement.

3. This article does not
set aside any
basis for criminal jurisdiction which
a State might have incorporated into
its national laws.

It is self-evident from the foregoing that Article 2 of the Munich draft
is unnecessary since it merely refers to Article 3. Similarly, the phrase
"independently of any other applicable jurisdiction" in Paragraph 1 of
Article 3 of the Munich draft is compensated for, and with freedom from
ambiguity, in the newly recommended Paragraph 3 of Article 3. The
Sub-committee regarded the Munich formulation as inherently ambiguous
for two reasons: (1) "There was the question of whether (the words
'Independently of any other applicable jurisdiction') meant that there was

a general concurrence of jurisdiction of the State of registration of the
aircraft with the penal jurisdiction of other States imposed for any other
reason or under any other legal theory (e.g., nationality of the offender,
nationality of the victim, etc.); and (2) there was a possibility that they
could be construed as importing into the convention any jurisdiction that
might be applicable under national law." Regarding the expression "competent jurisdiction" used in its revision to Paragraph 1 of Article 3, the
Sub-committee was unable to agree, and therefore submitted the question
to the Legal Committee, on whether "it is optional or obligatory for a
State to enact laws giving itself jurisdiction." It did consider, however,
that it was not obligatory for a State to try offenders and apply its penal
laws to them.
The Sub-committee debated at length whether Article 3 created a system of priority between the State of registration and the territorial State.
Noting that the Legal Committee at Munich had decided against any
system of priorities at all, the Sub-committee decided to recommend an
amendment "to make it clear that this provision dealt solely with the
problem of keeping interference with air traffic (by the territorial State)
to a minimum and did not establish any act of priority." Thus the phrase
"shall not exercise jurisdiction" was deleted; and the phrase "may not

compel the aircraft to land in order to exercise jurisdiction" was substituted
therefor.
The Sub-committee recommended, as advocated by the United States,
that the draft convention contain an article specifically providing that
the Convention shall not be deemed to create a right to request extradition. The United States hijacking proposal was referred to the Legal Committee. Because, in the main, the numerous technical and substantive
changes recommended to that part of the draft convention dealing with
the aircraft commander were incorporated in the Tokyo Convention, a
detailed discussion of these articles will be presented in the last part of
this paper.
G. Legal Committee, Rome, 1962
The Fourteenth Session of the Legal Committee, which met at Rome
in August-September, 1962, had the task of further refining the draft

convention with a view to submitting a recommended text to the Tokyo
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Conference."' Few substantive changes were made to the text as recom-

mended by the 1961 Munich Sub-committee. However, the work of the
Committee was useful because a number of questions were settled.
The Legal Committee, by a vote of twenty-two to two, defeated a
United States proposal to reduce the scope of the draft convention "to
exclude the treatment of offenses per se, committed on board, and to deal
only with such acts, whether or not they constituted an offense, as were
prejudicial to the safety of the aircraft or persons and property thereon
or to good order or discipline on board." In support of this proposal, the
United States contended that a convention so limited would correspond
more closely with the objectives of ICAO itself; namely, safety in air
navigation. The contrary argument was that such a limitation would
destroy an important part of the raison d'etre of the Convention, and in
this connection reference was made to the 1959 Munich Legal Committee's
analysis of the need for such a Convention. Similarly, proposals to create
a system of priorities were defeated. A majority of the Committee decided
that the article setting forth the rule that "the State of regisration of the
aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed on
board the aircraft" required each contracting State to be "bound to take
such means as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over offenses
committed on board aircraft registered in that State," but that there is
no similar obligation to try offenses. Paragraph 1 of Article 3, as proposed
by the 1961 Montreal Sub-committee, provided that "the State in whose
airspace the offense was committed, if such State is not the State of registration of the aircraft, may not compel the aircraft to land in order to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction except (in five cases)." The Legal Committee recast this provision so that it applies not only to the State overflown, but to any contracting State except the State of registration of the
aircraft. This change was adopted at Tokyo.
The Committee also included in its revised draft an article dealing with
hijacking similar in substance to that proposed by the United States. It
was decided that the Convention should not deal with the question of
jurisdiction in relation to an aircraft operated under a bare-hull charter
by a person, corporate or natural, who is not a national of the State of
registration. Any solution of the problem, the Committee determined,
should be sought outside the Convention, and the matter was referred to
a Sub-committee for subsequent study. The various changes, largely technical in nature, made by the Committee to that part of the draft convention dealing with the powers and duties of the aircraft commander
were substantially incorporated in the Tokyo Convention, and therefore
will be dealt with in Part IV of this paper.
IV.

THE TOKYO CONVENTION AND THE WORK OF THE CONFERENCE

A. General
The Convention, as enacted at Tokyo, has four principal purposes.
First, it makes it clear that the state of registration of an aircraft has
the authority to apply its laws to events occurring on board its air" The following is derived from the Report of the Fourteenth Session of the Legal Committee,
Rome, ICAO Doc. 8302-LC/150-1, pp. xx-xxxii. Quotations are taken from the Report and
therefore individual citations will not be given.
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craft while in flight no matter where it may be. From the standpoint
of the United States, this is probably the most important aspect of the
Convention, since it accords international recognition to the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction under the circumstances contemplated in the
Convention. Second, the Convention provides the aircraft commander with
the necessary authority to deal with persons who have committed, or are
about to commit, a crime or an act jeopardizing safety on board his aircraft through use of reasonable force when required, and without fear of
subsequent retaliation through civil suit or otherwise. Third, the Convention delineates the duties and responsibilities of the contracting State in
which an aircraft lands after the commission of a crime on board, including its authority over, and responsibilities to, any offenders that may
be either disembarked within territory of that State or delivered to its
authorities. The fourth major subject dealt with by the Convention is
the crime of "hijacking."
Before taking up in detail the text of the Convention there are certain
omissions from the text which warrant special mention. First, is the absence
from the Convention of any attempt to develop a system of priorities
governing the order in which the several possible criminal jurisdictions,
including the one given to the State of registry of the aircraft, can be
exercised. As earlier described, throughout the development of the Convention there was strong sentiment within the Legal Committee that such
a system of priorities was essential. Further, there was considerable support
for a system that gave first priority to the State of first landing regardless
of where the crime or other act had been committed, even, for example,
where it had been committed in the territorial airspace of the State of
registration of the aircraft. This was strongly resisted by the United States
and by other States. As the Convention evolved, support for a system of
priorities gradually weakened and the text ultimately put before the Tokyo
Conference by the 1962 Rome Legal Committee contained no such provision, nor does the text adopted at Tokyo.
Second, the text adopted at Tokyo contains no provision dealing with
the subject of double jeopardy or ne bis in idem. As we have seen, this
provision had been suggested in the United States draft of 1956, and it
had been retained in all subsequent drafts. The 1962 Rome Legal Committee had proposed a text for the Convention on this subject, 2 which,
while containing a number of still unsolved problems, was basically satisfactory and consistent with United States law. At the Tokyo Conference
the deletion of the text was proposed and carried by a surprising majority.
On the whole it is probably better to have such an article in the Convention than not, but its absence is not fatal. In other provisions of the Con4Article

3

1. Where a final judgment has been rendered by the competent authorities of one Contracting
State in respect of a person for an offence, such person shall not be convicted in another Contracting State for the same act if he was acquitted or if, in the case of a conviction, the punishment
was remitted or fully carried out, or if the time for the carrying out of the punishment has expired.
2. The provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall not apply if the person is a national or
a permanent resident of the second State or if the act constituted an offence against the national
security of such State, and its laws permit further trial.
3. Whenever, pursuant to the preceding paragraphs, a new punishment may be imposed by
the competent authorities of another Contracting State, those authorities shall take into account
the punishment or part of punishment already carried out in the first State. (Vol. I, Minutes Legal
Committee of ICAO, 14th Session, ICAO Doc. 8302-LC/150-1, p. xx-xxl.)
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vention, persons who are taken into custody or are subjected to trial or
prosecution under the Convention are given all the protections of the laws
of the States in which such action occurs (Article 15, para. 2). Thus, in
the United States the constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy
will apply. Since the great majority of other States also have similar provisions in their own laws, the same result will follow in most cases. In
fact, many States explained their support of the motion to delete the provisions on the ground that the existing law of their country made it unnecessary.'
Third, the Convention is also silent on the question of aircraft under
bare-hull charter to a national of a State other than the State of registry.
The Legal Committee had appointed a Sub-committee to make a special
study of this problem, and the report of that Committee was made directly
to the Tokyo Conference." The Sub-committee was unable to reach complete agreement on how to deal with the question and in essence put forward three possible solutions, one of which was that no special provision
on this subject was necessary. Another suggestion was that there be a
provision in the Convention making it clear that a State, whose national
was operating under a bare-hull lease an aircraft registered in another
State, might apply its laws to events occurring on that aircraft if it so
chose, but that the exercise of such jurisdiction should fall entirely outside
the scope of the Convention. These two possible solutions were discussed
at length in the Conference separately and in association with the problem
of how to treat aircraft operated by an airline formed as a consortium
of several States, the aircraft of which might have no national registration.
Ultimately the Conference decided that no provision on the subject was
necessary, for the stated reason that States remained free to apply their laws
to such aircraft, if they chose, independently of the Convention.
Bearing in mind the omissions from the text discussed, we will now take
up an article-by-article examination of the text adopted by the Tokyo Conference. The Conference, in the course of developing the Convention,
decided to divide it into seven chapters in order to facilitate grouping
of articles dealing with related subjects. Thus, the discussion of the articles
of the Convention which follows begins with a brief description of the
content of the chapter, then a quotation of the text of each article of
the chapter followed by a commentary on the article.
B. Chapter I-Scope Of The Convention
This Chapter contains all the provisions defining the acts to which the
Convention is to apply, the circumstances under which it is to apply, and
its geographic scope. It also contains those provisions excluding from the
application of the Convention certain types of aircraft and certain types
of crimes.
Article 1
1. This Convention shall apply in respect of:

a) offences against penal law;
b) acts which, whether or not they are offences, may or do jeopardize the
"' Report of Subcommittee, Vol. II Documents, Legal Committee of ICAO, 14th Session, Doc.

8302-LC/150-2, pp. 14-15.
"Documentation

for Diplomatic Conference, Tokyo, Japan, ICAO Doc. 6.
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safety of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which
jeopardize good order and discipline on board.
2. Except as provided in Chapter III, this Convention shall apply in respect
of offences committed or acts done by a person on board any aircraft
registered in a Contracting State, while that aircraft is in flight or on
the surface of the high seas or of any other area outside the territory of
any State.
3. For the purposes of this Convention, an aircraft is considered to be in
flight from the moment when power is applied for the purpose of takeoff until the moment when the landing run ends.
4. This Convention shall not apply to aircraft used in military, customs, or
police services.
In general, the purpose of Article 1 is to establish the scope of the
Convention in terms of subject matter and geography. Paragraph 1
defines the nature of the acts to which the Convention applies as including
not only acts which are offenses under penal law but also those acts which
may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft, persons or property therein,
or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board regardless of
whether they are also offenses. It was argued at the Conference that this
broad application was unnecessary and that the principal purpose of the
Convention would be served if it brought within its scope only those acts
which affected safety and good order and discipline on board, whether or
not such acts might also be penal offenses. However, this argument was
rejected by a majority, principally on the grounds that another provision
of the Convention limited the authority of the aircraft commander to
take action in respect to those acts committed on board his aircraft which
directly affected the safety of the aircraft and jeopardized good order and
discipline on board. Thus, the majority considered that sufficient limitation
on the scope of the Convention already existed, and that the jurisdiction of
a State as distinguished from the authority of the aircraft commander
should not be limited.
Another proposal of limitation put forward to the Conference was the
suggestion that Paragraph 1 of Article 1 be limited to the case of "serious"
offenses under the penal laws of the State of registration. It was pointed
out, that except for the adjective "serious," the language of the draft proposed by the Legal Committee probably would be interpreted to mean
serious offenses in any event and that this suggestion was, therefore, intended only for clarification. However, this proposal also failed to find a
majority. Nevertheless, during this discussion it became apparent that a
number of countries were concerned over the apparently unlimited
scope of the jurisdiction conferred upon contracting States to enact laws
applying to events occurring on board their aircraft. For this reason, the
Conference subsequently amended Article 2 to restrict the scope of this
provision.
Paragraph 2 of Article 1 of the Convention deals with the problem of
the geographical scope of the Convention. It provides that the Convention
applies to offenses committed or acts done by a person who is on board an
aircraft, thereby excluding acts or offenses committed by persons not on
board the aircraft, such as saboteurs who remain on the ground. This paragraph takes a different approach to the manner by which the geographical
scope of the Convention is described than that proposed by the Legal Com-

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

mittee. The Legal Committee's approach had been to make the primary
rule the fact that the aircraft was in flight outside of the territorial airspace
of the State of registry. However, as we have seen, this required the
enumeration of certain additional situations in which the Convention
should not apply." Some members of the Conference found this method
of describing the geographical application of the Convention to be confusing. Other members of the Conference were concerned that it might
inadvertently leave outside the scope of the Convention some situation
with which the Convention should deal. For these reasons the Conference
attempted to find a more general and simple method of describing the
geographical application of the Convention. Under the formula ultimately
adopted in the text quoted above, all that is necessary in order for the
Convention to apply is that the aircraft be in flight or be on the surface
of the high seas or on the surface of another area which is outside the
territory of a State.
One consequence of using this approach is that the Convention purports
to apply to an aircraft while the aircraft is operating wholly within its
own territorial airspace. Generally speaking, an international convention
should not intrude upon purely domestic affairs of the contracting States
normally governed only by national legislation. However, in the case of
this Convention, this defect is more apparent than real. An aircraft while
operating in the airspace of the country of its registry would be subject to
the laws of its own country in any event. Thus, this approach in fact is
not inconsistent with the application of national laws; and has the desirable attribute of covering completely in a short and simple phrase all cases
where application of the Convention is desirable, whether such cases occur
wholly or partially outside the territorial airspace of the State of registry.
Paragraph 3 defines "in flight" by considering it to be the period from
the moment when power is applied for take-off until the moment the
landing run of the aircraft has ended. This language follows the definition
used in other international legislation where the same problem exists."
Paragraph 4 defines the class of aircraft to which the Convention applies
by excluding aircraft used in military, customs or police services and, in
so doing, virtually adopts the Chicago Convention formulation. Thus,
even though an aircraft is registered in a contracting State, it is not within
the scope of the Convention if used for military, customs or police services.
Most military aircraft are not "registered" in a contracting State in the
normal sense, and so presumably would not have been included with the
provisions of paragraph 2 in any event. However, by specifically providing that the Convention would not apply to aircraft used in military, cus45

Article I
This Convention shall apply in respect of: 1) offences against penal laws; 2) acts which,
whether or not they are an offence, may or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or persons or
property therein or which jeopardize good order and discipline on board, when such offences are

committed or such acts are done by a person on board any aircraft registered in a Contracting
State, while the aircraft is: a) in flight in the airspace of a State other than the State of registration
of the aircraft; or b) in flight between two points of which at least one is outside the State of
registration of the aircraft; or c) in flight between two points in the territory of the State of
registration of the aircraft if a subsequent landing is made in another Contracting State with the
said person still on board; or d) on the surface of the high seas or of any other area outside the
territory of any State. (Vol. I, Minutes, Legal Committee of ICAO, 14th Session, ICAO Doc.
8302-LC/150-1, p. xix.)
" E.g., Article 1,paragraph 2, Rome Convention, ICAO Doc. LC/134, Vol. II, p. 250.
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toms or police services, it was made clear that when a registered aircraft is
being used in the military, customs or police service that aircraft is not,
during the period of such use, subject to this Convention.
Article 2
Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 4 and except when the safety
of the aircraft or of persons or property on board so requires, no provision
of this Convention shall be interpreted as authorizing or requiring any action
in respect of offences against penal laws of a political nature or those based
on racial or religious discrimination.
As indicated supra in the discussion of Article 1, the provisions of Article
2 limiting the scope of the Convention were inserted by the Conference
after the earlier proposal to confine the Convention to offenses affecting
safety was rejected. Without this limitation, any offense against any penal
law is within the Convention. This would mean, of course, that offenses
of a political nature and those based on racial or religious discrimination
would have been included. In the opinion of many of the countries present
at the Conference this would be undesirable. For this reason, the Conference adopted a formulation which assures that offenses against purely political laws and those based on racial or religious discrimination cannot be
enforced under the Convention, except to the extent that they are acts
which jeopardize safety or good order and discipline on board. This Article
presents some obvious questions of interpretation. Penal laws forbidding
various forms of racial and religious discrimination take many and varied
forms, and the views of the courts of the contracting States may differ
on the issue of whether one or the other is within or without the Convention. Even more divergence of view can be expected in decisions which
involve the question of whether a particular offense is of a "political nature."
C. Chapter II-urisdiction
Article 3
1. The State of registration of the aircraft is competent to exercise jurisdiction over offences and acts committed on board.
2. Each contracting State shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction as the State of registration over offences committed
on board aircraft registered in such State.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with national law.
During the development of the draft convention in the Legal Committee,
and as indicated earlier, the subject matter of paragraph 1 of Article 3
was considered to be the most significant of the entire Convention. Pursuant to this paragraph, contracting States agree to grant international
recognition to the extraterritorial exercise of jurisdiction by other contracting States over offenses and acts committed on board aircraft of its
registry. In the absence of some provision of international law of this type,
the exercise of jurisdiction by a State over any act or offense committed
on board its aircraft, particularly when that aircraft is in flight within the
territorial airspace of another State, appears open to question. Its adoption
by the Conference provides a sound legal basis for the extraterritorial
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exercise of criminal jurisdiction extending even to cases of flight within
foreign territorial airspace.
In the discussions both in the Legal Committee and during the Conference, different opinions as to the effect of paragraph 1 were expressed by
many States.4 It was always the view of the United States that the effect
of this paragraph was only to grant international recognition of the exercise of jurisdiction. On the other hand, some States insisted that the paragraph not only granted international recognition of the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction, but it also placed upon contracting States an obligation to implement this jurisdiction. Some States went so far as to take
the position that this obligation meant that the existing penal code of a
contracting State would automatically apply to acts and offenses occurring
on board its aircraft as soon as a State became party to the Convention.
The Minutes of the 1962 Rome Legal Committee"8 contain the following summary of the situation presented by the Chief of the United States
Delegation:
Mr. Boyle (United States of America) said that the principal purpose of
Article 3 (1), as originally conceived, had been to provide international
recognition for the extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction by one State over
an event that might occur in the airspace of another. This was not a commonly accepted principle of international law and, therefore, could not be
lightly disposed of on the ground that it was unnecessary to mention it. If
contracting States were going to be permitted to exercise extra-territorial
jurisdiction, some international document should specifically authorize this.
For example, a murder might occur on board an aircraft of State X while
that aircraft was in the airspace of State Y and the aircraft might thereupon
proceed to State X where the offender would be tried and convicted in
accordance with the law of State X. Ordinarily State Y would not favorably
regard the exercise of jurisdiction by State X over a murder that had been
committed in the territory of State Y. It was to cover this situation that, in
the view of his Delegation, an international convention should specifically
recognize the authority or competence of a State to exercise its jurisdiction
for the purpose indicated on aircraft of its registry. This was what Article
3 (1) had set out to do. The Convention would close the gap so that offenders
who might commit crimes in the airspace of one country and then found
themselves in the territory of another, whose laws they had not violated,
could not escape.
The discussion in the Committee had confused the object of the Convention
by talking in terms of whether a State was obliged to exercise its jurisdiction.
It seemed that two completely separate thoughts were involved and they
should be kept separate.
" The report of the Sub-committee on Legal Status of the Aircraft in Vol. II Documents, 14th
Session Legal Committee of ICAO, Doc. 8302-LC/150-2, p. 13 contains the following comment:
Article 3, paragraph I (Second Part)
14. The expression "competent jurisdiction" used in the remaining part of Article 3 (1) raised
two questions: (1) Was it obligatory or optional for a State to enact laws giving it jurisdiction?
(2) Was it obligatory or optional for a State to try offenders and to apply its penal laws to them?
15. The Sub-committee could not agree on an answer to the first
question and calls the attention
of the Legal Committee to the necessity of reaching a decision on this question.
16. In regard to the second question, the Sub-committee considered that, while it should be
recognized that the State of registration was competent to apply its penal law to offences occurring
on board its aircraft outside its territory, that State would be under no obligation to try offenders
and apply its penal laws to them.
4s14th Session, Legal Committee of ICAO, Doc. 8302-LC/1S0-1, p. 79.
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The French proposal dealt only with the second thought and only by implication, if at all, dealt with the primary purpose of Article 3 (1). Therefore,
he was opposed to the French proposal.
Many Delegates had enunciated different principles in regard to the question
which asked to what extent and in what manner a State was compelled to
exercise its jurisdiction.
Some States had said that, by mere ratification of the Convention, their
criminal codes would automatically apply on board their aircraft and, therefore, they had no problem. But this was not the case in the United States
where a very different thing, in fact, happened. The automatic application of
criminal codes to aircraft was an . . . unusual condition, rather than usual.
But the States which had the automatic concept or principle seemed to feel
that the other States should automatically apply some criminal code to events
occurring on board their aircraft when they ratified this Convention. But
this gave some difficulty. For example, who would presume to dictate to a
State what offences it wished to make crimes on board its aircraft? Yet,
inherent in the concept of those Delegates who had spoken for the selfexecution of the treaty was that exact concept. There might be acts on board
aircraft which should be made criminal which, if performed on the ground
within the municipal territory of the State, should not be criminal. Hence,
when dealing with the second part of this problem, one must leave this
question to the State.
His Delegation would have no objection if a formula could be found to
express the fact that contracting States which ratified the Convention must
be left the freedom of a sovereign State in determining what kinds of acts
would be made crimes on board their aircraft and what kinds of penalties
would be applicable to such acts. But what the Committee had done was to
discuss only this question which was, at best, secondary and ignore the first
question which was what Article 3 (1) had set out to do originally. He
suggested that Article 3 (1) be amended so as to make it clearly accomplish
only the first purpose and leave the second purpose to be taken care of by
another paragraph, if necessary. This could be accomplished by deleting from
Article 3 (1) the words "is competent to" and substituting therefor the
word "may" so that the text, as thus amended, would read:
"1. The State of registration of the aircraft may exercise jurisdiction
over offences committed on board the aircraft."
As this quotation indicates, the United States and others strongly opposed
the view that it was obligatory for a contracting State to impose any
existing criminal code to acts occurring on board its aircraft, and the
language of the Article as drafted by the Conference reflects these views.
The key to the decision of the Conference on this point is contained in
a proposal of the United Kingdom adopted as an instruction to the Drafting Committee."' This instruction reads as follows:
"That the Drafting Committee examine the three texts of Article 2, paragraph 2, subparagraph (a) and produce a common text as close as possible
to the existing texts which will reflect the principles that, while each State is
obliged to establish jurisdiction over offences committed on board aircraft
registered in that State, each State has power to define the precise offences
over which jurisdiction is to be asserted and to decide whether to enforce
its jurisdiction."
49

Documentation for Diplomatic Conference, Tokyo, Japan, ICAO Doc. SR/9.
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Pursuant to that instruction, the Drafting Committee produced paragraph 2 of Article 3 which provides that a contracting State is under
obligation only to take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction. While the language is not completely clear,"° nevertheless since
it is specifically intended to reflect the intent of the Conference contained
in the instruction quoted above, any ambiguities in the text can be cured
by reference to the instruction.
Article 3 also contains a paragraph (paragraph 3) to the effect that this
Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance with international law. This paragraph is designed to serve several
purposes. In the first place, as originally conceived by the Legal Committee, the paragraph was intended to reflect the fact that the jurisdiction
over offenses or acts committed on board an aircraft while in flight was an
additional concurrent criminal jurisdiction which a State could exercise
without prejudice to other criminal jurisdictions that the State might exercise under other legal theories. During the Tokyo Conference, this language
was further expanded to make it clear that any form of criminal jurisdiction exercised by a State under its national law would still be available
regardless of whether such jurisdiction was exercised under common law,
constitutional provision, statutory provision, or as a consequence of treaties
or other international agreements.
Article 4
A Contracting State which is not the State of registration may not interfere
with an aircraft in flight in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over
an offence committed on board except in the following cases:
a) the offence has effect on the territory of such State;
b) the offence has been committed by or against a national or permanent
resident of such State;
c) the offence is against the security of such State;
d) the offence consists of a breach of any rules or regulations relating to
the flight or manoeuvre of aircraft in force in such State;
e) the exercise of jurisdiction is necessary to ensure the observance of any
obligation of such State under a multilateral international agreement.

The provisions of Article 4 are related to kindred clauses in the Maritime
Convention on The Law of the Sea. The Legal Committee incorporated
them into the early drafts of the Convention originally for the purpose
of describing the occasions on which the State over whose territory a
particular offense was committed could exercise its jurisdiction. This particular use of Article 4 was related to the earlier attempts to create a
priority system in the Convention and had been abandoned by the Legal
Committee before submitting the text of a draft convention to the Tokyo
Conference. Instead, the text sent by the Legal Committee to the Tokyo
Conference was one which, consistent with the principle that existing
criminal jurisdictions were not superseded by this Convention, recognized
the application of the jurisdiction of any State in whose airspace a particular offense was committed. With this revision, the purpose served by
Article 4 is to prescribe the conditions under which the State in whose
" In fact on this issue, it is the exact language of the draft proposed by the Legal Committee
at its 14th Session in Rome. See Article 2, paragraphs I and 2, page xx, Vol. I, Minutes, ICAO
Legal Committee, 14th Session, ICAO Doc. 8302-LC/150-1.
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airspace an offense has been committed may interfere with an aircraft while
in flight within its airspace for the purpose of exercising its criminal jurisdiction. As so revised, it did not constitute any limitaton on the jursdiction
of the State so overflown.
The Tokyo Conference adopted the theory of this Article as developed
by the Legal Committee with only one minor exception. The word "delay"
was stricken'from the Article as proposed by the Legal Committee on the
grounds that subsequent portions of the Convention (Article 17) adequately take account of the problems of delay, and all that is necessary in
this Article is to prescribe the conditions under which a State other than
the State of registry may interfere with an aircraft in flight in order to
exercise its criminal jurisdiction.
It is important to note precisely the limitation imposed on the so-called
territorial State by this Article. The territorial State is not to interfere
with the flight of aircraft in its airspace except under the enumerated
conditions "in order to exercise its criminal jurisdiction." Thus, the State
overflown may "interfere with an aircraft" for any other purpose which
it deems proper. The exclusive sovereignty of the territorial State over the
airspace above its territory recognized by the Chicago Convention is not
derogated by this provision. The application of the jurisdiction of the
territorial State is explicitly recognized in this Article; the State overflown
merely agrees not to use a particular measure to vindicate that jurisdiction,
and in fact may use that exact measure for other purposes. Indeed, the

Legal Committee had in its earlier consideration of this matter specifically
rejected a proposal designed to directly limit the jurisdiction of the overflown State."'

D. Chapter III-Powers Of The Aircraft Commander
This Chapter is devoted to those provisions dealing with the authority
of the aircraft commander. These Articles describe the acts and offenses
to which his authority applies, the period of time during which it exists,
its extent, and its limitations. Their terms also impose on the aircraft
commander certain specific obligations with which he must comply in
order to bring himself within the protection accorded him by the Convention. This portion of the Convention has a high practical value to
both the airline operators and their crews, because it grants the aircraft
commander and others protection from legal actions brought against them
because of the use of force which, without the legal authority granted by
the Convention, might subject the aircraft commander and others to legal
liability in some national jurisdictions.
Article 5
1. The provisions of this Chapter shall not apply to offences and acts committed or about to be committed by a person on board an aircraft in flight
in the airspace of the State of registration or over the high seas or any other
area outside the territory of any State unless the last point of take-off or the
next point of intended landing is situated in a State other than that of registration, or the aircraft subsequently flies in the airspace of a State other than
that of registration with such person still on board.
2. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 1, paragraph 3, an aircraft shall
"Vol.

II, p. 94 and Vol. I, pp. 87-96, Minutes, Legal Committee of ICAO, supra.
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for the purposes of this Chapter, be considered to be in flight at any time
from the moment when all its external doors are closed following embarkation until the moment when any such door is opened for disembarkation.
In the case of a forced landing, the provisions of this Chapter shall continue
to apply with respect to offences and acts committed on board until competent authorities of a State take over the responsibility for the aircraft and for
the persons and property on board.
Article 5 defines the period during which the powers of the aircraft
commander exist in a manner different from that used in Article 1 to
describe the application of the Convention for jurisdictional purposes.
Unlike Article 1, Paragraph 1 of Article 5 states that the powers of the
aircraft commander exist while his aircraft is in flight in the airspace of
the State of registration only when the last point of take-off or the next
point of intended landing is outside of the State of registration, or the
aircraft subsequently enters the airspace of a State other than the State
of registration. The purpose of this provision is to make it clear that the
Convention does not purport to interfere with the domestic law of contracting States by imposing responsibilities on the aircraft commander or
to prescribe the limits of his authority, except in the situation in which
international flight is involved. Thus, flights between two points within
the territory of the State of registration, even though the aircraft operates
over the high seas, do not bring the provisions of this Chapter into play.
As indicated in the discussion of Paragraph 2 of Article 1, the entire
Convention previously used an approach similar to that expressed in Paragraph 1 of Article 5, but shifted to a more general expression in the interest of simplicity. This was possible in Article 1 because when dealing with
the question of jurisdiction, the Conference did not consider it harmful
to use language which in its broadest reach in fact applied the Convention
to a purely domestic matter. However, in the case of the powers and duties
of the aircraft commander, the Conference was of the opinion that there
existed a possibility of conflict between the Convention and domestic law
which this paragraph avoids.
As indicated, Paragraph 2 of Article 5 constitutes an extension of the
scope of the Convention insofar as the authority of the aircraft commander is concerned. It provides that for this purpose the aircraft is to be
considered in flight as soon as the external doors are closed following embarkation, and the powers of the aircraft commander are to remain in
effect until such time these doors are opened for disembarkation. Thus, for
the purposes of this Chapter, the aircraft need not be airborne for the
aircraft commander to take necessary measures to preserve the safety of
his aircraft and its passengers. His authority exists during the period the
aircraft is taxiing on the apron, or while waiting for clearance to enter
or depart from the apron area, or awaiting clearance to take-off; in these
last three cases, as air travelers are well aware, substantial periods of time
may be involved. Additionally, should the aircraft make a forced landing,
the authority of the aircraft commander continues with respect to offenses
and acts which have been or are committed on board until the competent
authorities of a State arrive to take over the responsibility.
Article 6
1. The aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable grounds to believe
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that a person has committed, or is about to commit, on board the aircraft,
an offence or act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1, impose upon such
person reasonable measures including restraint which are necessary:
a) to protect the safety of the aircraft, or of persons or property therein; or
b) to maintain good order and discipline on board; or
c) to enable him to deliver such person to competent authorities or to disembark him in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter.
2. The aircraft commander may require or authorize the assistance of other
crew members and may request or authorize, but not require, the assistance
of passengers to restiain any person whom he is entitled to restrain. Any
crew member or passenger may also take reasonable preventive measures
without such authorization when he has reasonable grounds to believe that
such action is immediately necessary to protect the safety of the aircraft, or
of persons or property therein.

This Article describes the powers of the aircraft commander over persons
on board his aircraft who may threaten its safety and prescribes conditions
to prevent their abuse. While an aircraft commander may impose restraint
upon a person threatening the safety of the aircraft or persons and property on board, he can do so only if he has reasonable grounds to believe
that the person in question has committed such an act or is about to commit it. Also, this authority of the aircraft commander is specifically limited
to "reasonable measures" which are necessary to accomplish the three
specific purposes enumerated in paragraph 1. Thus, he must use only
reasonable force and only for the enumerated purposes and not to accomplish any other objective. As an example, under the Convention the aircraft commander is given no authority or responsibility to deal with the
case of a known criminal whom he finds on board, and for whom the
police authorities of the next point of landing are looking, unless the
criminal conducts himself in such a way or the circumstances on board
the aircraft become such that the conditions specified in paragraph 1 occur.
Thus, the mere presence of a known criminal on board an aircraft creates
no authority in the aircraft commander to take any form of police action,
nor is he made responsible for such action.'
In paragraph 2 the aircraft commander is given authority to secure the
assistance of other crew members in the exercise of the authority vested
in him by paragraph 1. He may additionally request, but not require, the
assistance of passengers in this endeavor. As a separate provision of paragraph 2, crew members and passengers are authorized to take reasonable
preventive measures without any authorization from the aircraft commander whenever they have reasonable grounds to believe that such action
is immediately necessary for safety reasons. This clause was attacked by
some delegates at the Tokyo Conference on the ground that passengers
normally would not be qualified to determine whether a particular act
jeopardized the safety of the aircraft or persons and property therein.
For that reason, it was unwise to give this authority to passengers. This
argument was resisted by other delegations on the grounds that the particular provision contemplated emergency type situations in which the
danger to the aircraft or persons and property on board was clear and
s On the other hand, if the known criminal has committed a criminal act in the State of registration by being absent from a particular place in that jurisdiction, a continuing "offence against
the penal law" may have occurred.
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present, and in fact no special technical knowledge would be required to
recognize the peril. This latter argument prevailed, although some delegations felt very strongly the other way.
In connection with the authority of crew members and passengers to
take action without prior authorization from the aircraft commander, it
is significant to note that they may take only "preventive" measures. Thus,
in any case, the independent authority of the crew member or passenger
is considerably less than that of the aircraft commander.
Article 7
1. Measures of restraint imposed upon a person in accordance with Article 6
shall not be continued beyond any point at which the aircraft lands unless:
a) such point is in the territory of a non-Contracting State and its authorities
refuse to permit disembarkation of that person or those measures have
been imposed in accordance with Article 6, paragraph 1 c) in order to
enable his delivery to competent authorities;
b) the aircraft makes a forced landing and the aircraft commander is unable
to deliver that person to competent authorities; or
c) that person agrees to onward carriage under restraint.
2. The aircraft commander shall as soon as practicable, and if possible before
landing in the territory of a State with a person on board who has been placed
under restraint in accordance with the provisions of Article 6, notify the
authorities of such State of the fact that a person on board is under restraint
and of the reasons for such restraint.

Paragraph 1 of Article 7 takes up the question of the duration of measures
of restraint which an aircraft commander may have imposed upon a
person on board his aircraft pursuant to the authority vested in him by
Article 6. It recognizes that in the normal situation such measures of restraint should not be continued beyond the first point of landing following
their imposition. However, the paragraph also recognizes the fact that
under certain circumstances measures of restraint may have to be continued beyond the point of first landing. The first condition under which
onward carriage under restraint is permitted is the situation that arises
when the first landing is in the territory of a non-contracting State, and
that State refuses to permit disembarkation. Additionally, onward carriage
is permitted when the measure of restraint has been imposed in order to
enable the aircraft commander to deliver the individual to competent
authorities, as distinguished from mere disembarkation. This latter exception is necessary because a non-contracting State has no obligation to
accept delivery. In fact, the aircraft commander has no authority to
"deliver" a person to the authorities of a non-contracting State (See
Article 9). One reason for this is that the provisions of the Convention
designed to safeguard the civil liberties of an individual under restraint
would not be binding upon the authorities of such non-contracting State.
Paragraph 1 of Article 7 also recognizes another exception by permitting
continuation of restraint in the situation that arises in the event of forced
landing. The final exception which permits onward carriage beyond the
first point of landing with a person still under restraint is the case in
which the person under restraint agrees to such onward carriage. This
provision stemmed from suggestions made in the Legal Committee and
at the Conference that for any number of reasons a person who had been
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placed under restraint by an aircraft commander might wish to be carried
onward and agree to continue to submit to restraint in order to do so if
the first point of landing (whether in a contracting or non-contracting

State) was in a State in which he did not wish to be disembarked or delivered to competent authorities.
Paragraph 2 of Article 7 takes account of the fact that States would

normally wish to know that there is a person who has been placed under
restraint on board an aircraft which lands in their territory. If practicable,
this notification is to be made before landing. It is noteworthy that the
obligation on the aircraft commander to give this notice extends to noncontracting States, as well as contracting States. In view of this fact,
presumably the aircraft commander would not be entitled to plead, in
defense of any action brought against him by a person on whom he had
imposed restraint, the existence of his authority under this Convention if
he failed to give this notification to a State in whose territory the aircraft
landed. Thus, at least in this respect, the notice operates for the protection
of the person under restraint, as well as for the purpose of notifying the
appropriate authorities of the State in which the aircraft lands of the
circumstances.
Article 8
1. The aircraft commander may, in so far as it is necessary for the purpose
of subparagraph a) or b) of paragraph 1 of Article 6, disembark in the
territory of any State in which the aircraft lands any person who he has
reasonable grounds to believe has committed, or is about to commit, on
board the aircraft an act contemplated in Article 1, paragraph 1 b).
2. The aircraft commander shall report to the authorities of the State in
which he disembarks any person pursuant to this Article, the fact of and
the reasons for, such disembarkation.
This Article grants an authority to the aircraft commander which is
slightly different from the authority conferred by Article 6. Under this
Article, the aircraft commander may disembark in the territory of any
State in which the aircraft lands any person who he has reasonable grounds
to believe has committed, or is about to commit, one of the offenses or acts
to which the Convention applies. His authority to disembark is specifically
limited to the case where this action is necessary to protect the safety of
the aircraft or persons and property therein or to maintain good order and
discipline on board. Thus, as an example, this Convention gives the aircraft
commander no authority to disembark a person merely because the aircraft
commander discovers that he is a known criminal. Of course, if the aircraft commander has reasonable grounds to believe that the presence on
board his aircraft of a known criminal may create such a condition as to
require him to take restraintive action in order to protect safety or insure
good order and discipline on board, then he is authorized to so act by the
Convention. Paragraph 1 of Article 8 authorizes the aircraft commander
to disembark a person, under the circumstances just described, in the
territory of any State in which the aircraft lands; this authority is not
limited to contracting States.
Paragraph 2 of Article 8 merely creates the obligation of the aircraft
commander to report to the authorities of the State in which he disembarks any person that fact and the reasons for such action.
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Article 9
1. The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities of any

Contracting State in the territory of which the aircraft lands any person
who he has reasonable grounds to believe has committed on board the aircraft
an act which, in his opinion, is a serious offence according to the penal law
of the State of registration of the aircraft.
2. The aircraft commander shall as soon as practicable and if possible before
landing in the territory of a Contracting State with a person on board whom
the aircraft commander intends to deliver in accordance with the preceding
paragraph, notify the authorities of such State of his intention to deliver such
person and the reasons therefor.
3. The aircraft commander shall furnish the authorities to whom any suspected offender is delivered in accordance with the provisions of this Article
with evidence and information which, under the law of the State of registra-

tion of the aircraft, are lawfully in his possession.
Paragraph 1 of this Article states the terms and conditions under which
an aircraft commander may deliver (as distinguished from disembark)
persons on board his aircraft to the competent authorities. In order to
assure the individual so delivered of the civil liberty protection provided
for in later Articles of the Convention, this authority to deliver is limited
to contracting States. It also provides that only those persons whom the
aircraft commander has reasonable grounds to believe have committed, on
board his aircraft, an act which is a serious offense can be "delivered." This
language excludes from the authority of the aircraft commander the power
"to deliver" persons who have committed crimes in places other than
on,
board the aircraft. It also excludes persons whose offense, even if committed
on board the aircraft, is not regarded as "serious." In this latter respect, it
provides that in determining whether the offense is "serious," the aircraft
commander is to look only to the penal law of the State of registration of
the aircraft; not to the penal laws of the State in which the aircraft may
be operating at the time nor to any others that might be applicable under
some other legal theory. The aircraft commander in making this judgment
is not held to an absolute standard by this paragraph, but rather is permitted to deliver to competent authorities any person who "in his opinion"
has committed a serious offense. Thus, the aircraft commander may make
an incorrect determination and deliver to competent authorities a person
whose act under the law of the State of registration of the aircraft may
be only a minor offense; but, if "in his opinion" it was a serious offense,
and this subjective judgment had some reasonable basis in fact, and was
not arbitrary and capricious, the aircraft commander would be acting
within the scope of his authority.
In adopting this text the Conference was following the recommendations made by the 1961 Montreal Sub-committee on the Legal Status of
the Aircraft which proposed virtually this same text. Its analysis of the
problem and reasons for following this course of action are as follows:
"In connection with Article 6 (2), the Subcommittee considered several
problems including the following:
(1) Whether the text of the Munich draft was susceptible of the interpretation that the aircraft commander might hold the person concerned in
custody while the aircraft was on the ground in a non-contracting
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State in order to deliver him to the competent authorities of the next
Contracting State in which the aircraft landed.
(2) Whether the aircraft commander might deliver to the competent
authorities of a Contracting State any person on whom he had imposed
restraint by virtue of action taken under Article 5.
(3) Whether Article 6 (2) should be confined to the case where the aircraft
commander had reason to believe that the person concerned had committed on board an aircraft an act which, in his opinion, was a serious
offence under the penal laws of the State of registration.
"Having examined all of the three problems mentioned above, the Subcommittee adopted and recommends the following new text of Article 6 (2):
2. The aircraft commander may deliver to the competent authorities
of any Contracting State in the territory of which the aircraft lands
any person upon whom he has imposed measures of restraint pursuant
to Article 5, if he has reasonable grounds to believe that such person has
committed on board the aircraft an act which, in his opinion, is a
serious offence according to the penal laws of the State of registration
of the aircraft.""3
Paragraph 2 of Article 9 provides for notification to the authorities

in the State in which the aircraft commander intends to make "delivery"
of a person. As in the case of disembarkation, he is to notify the authorities of his intention and the reason for such action.
Paragraph 3 deals with the problem of what obligation the aircraft
commander has to furnish evidence of a suspected crime to the authorities
of a State to whom a suspected offender is delivered. This particular clause
has always proved troublesome." The Legal Committee, after spending a
great deal of time on this question, was never able to reach a very satisfactory solution. In the view of the writers, the Convention, in Paragraph
3 of Article 9, presents a better formulation.
Under this paragraph, the aircraft commander is under obligation to
furnish the authorities to whom he delivers a suspected offender evidence
and information, which by the law of the State of registration of the
aircraft are lawfully in his possession. Under this phraseology, the aircraft
commander in examining witnesses is bound by the law of the State of
registration. Thus, in the case of United States aircraft, the privilege
against self-incrimination would be available to persons being examined;
so also would the provisions of law governing search and seizure. Additionally, this provision of the Convention makes it possible for the United
States, for example, through its airline operators or otherwise, to instruct
its aircraft commanders as to the nature and extent of their obligation to

furnish evidence and information, and thus assure that United States law
will be adhered to by aircraft commanders of United States aircraft.
In this connection it should be noted that once the aircraft lands in a

State its authorities normally would have the right to enter the aircraft
for the purpose of collecting evidence. Thus, although the obligation of
the aircraft commander to furnish evidence and information is controlled
by the law of the State of registration, the extent to which the authorities
of a State in which the aircraft lands may go in collecting additional
evidence and information is subject to the laws of that State, not the laws
of the State of registration.
5aVol.

II, Documents, 14th Session Legal Committee, ICAO, Doc. 8302-LC/150-2, p. 18.
04See, for example, Vol. I, Minutes, 14th Session Legal Committee, pp. 120-130.
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Article 10
For actions taken in accordance with this Convention, neither the aircraft
commander, any other member of the crew, any passenger, the owner or
operator of the aircraft, nor the person on whose behalf the flight was performed shall be held responsible in any proceeding on account of the treatment undergone by the person against whom the actions were taken.
This is the provision in Chapter III which accords to the aircraft commander and others protection against any legal liability that may arise
as a consequence of actions taken against a person pursuant to the authority
granted by the Convention. This provision had not presented any great
difficulty during the development of the Convention by the Legal Committee; however, at the Tokyo Conference there was extensive debate
concerning this Article. One of the issues debated was whether the protection accorded by the Article should extend only to "liability" or whether
the Article should be more broadly written so as to encompass possible
criminal or administrative proceedings. The United States and other delegations supported a broadly phrased Article, and as ultimately written the
protection granted extends to all actions: criminal and administrative,
as well as civil.
Another issue debated at the Conference was whether the protection
accorded the aircraft commander, passengers, crew members, the airline
and others, should be extended to actions brought by or on behalf of any
person on board the aircraft or whether it should be limited to actions
brought by the person "against whom the actions were taken"; for example, in taking action to restrain a particular passenger the aircraft
commander damages a valuable article belonging to another passenger,
such as a camera. Should the aircraft commander be entitled to protection
against suit brought by the passenger whose camera has been damaged
merely because the aircraft commander is acting within the scope of his
authority according to this Convention? The answer given by the Tokyo
Conference to this question is in the negative; Article 10 limits the protection to actions brought by the offending passenger.
E. Chapter IV-Unlawful Seizure Of Aircraft
As earlier related, this provision was originally proposed by the United
States at a meeting of the Sub-committee of the Legal Committee in 1962.
It was reiterated by the United States during the meeting of the 1962
Legal Committee, at which time the United States received active support
from the Government of Venezuela.
Article 11
1. When a person on board has unlawfully committed by force or threat
thereof an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control
of an aircraft in flight or when such an act is about to be committed, Contracting States shall take all appropriate measures to restore control of the
aircraft to its lawful commander or to preserve his control of the aircraft.
2. In the cases contemplated in the preceding paragraph, the Contracting
State in which the aircraft lands shall permit its passengers and crew to continue their journey as soon as practicable, and shall return the aircraft and
its cargo to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.
In the draft convention prepared by the Legal Committee this Article
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dealt not only with the problems touched upon in paragraphs 1 and 2,
but also included some of the provisions dealing with the responsibilities
and authorities of States in which the aircraft subsequently landed. The
Tokyo Conference transferred these provisions to the next Chapter.
The approach taken by this Article to the crime of unlawful seizure of
aircraft avoids attempting either the description of an international crime
or the attempt to make such action a crime under international law. Instead, the Article provides that the contracting States have certain obligations whenever a person on board an aircraft has unlawfully committed
by force or threat thereof an act of interference, seizure, or other wrongful exercise of control. The question of whether a particular act is lawful
or unlawful is to be judged by the law of the State of registration of the
aircraft or the law of the State in whose airspace the aircraft may be in
flight. By the use of this technique, it is unnecessary for the Convention
to attempt by international law to proscribe a particular act as criminal;
instead, the Convention relies upon the existing applicable criminal codes
of the contracting States. While there was considerable debate at the
Tokyo Conference over the question of whether the act must not only be
unlawful but also must encompass either the use of force or the threat of
force, the fact that in the final analysis the unlawfulness is to be measured
by the law of either the State of registry or the territorial State seems to
make such consideration somewhat academic.
Paragraph 1, in the event of commission of the act of hijacking, imposes on all contracting States the obligation to take appropriate measures
to restore or preserve the aircraft commander's control of the aircraft.
The words "appropriate measures" are intended to mean only those
things which it is feasible for a contracting State to do and also only
those things which it is lawful for a contracting State to do. Thus, a
contracting State thousands of miles away from the scene of the hijacking
is not under any obligation to take any action, because it would not be
feasible for it to do so. Similarly, a contracting State would not be expected to pursue with its military aircraft a hijacked aircraft into the
territorial airspace of another State without the permission of that State,
because to do so would be unlawful.5 Of course, once an aircraft lands
" The minutes of the Legal Committee include a discussion on this precise point of interpretation
as follows: "Mr. Kean (United Kingdom) stated that, besides supporting the Spanish proposal to
delete paragraph (b), he had a proposal to make in regard to paragraph (a). This proposal related
to the words 'in or near whose airspace the aircraft is operated' included by the Delegations of the
United States of America and Australia.
"In the first place, it was not known exactly what was meant by 'near' and that introduced an
element of imprecision into the Convention. Secondly, he wished to draw attention to the fact that
there were many States situated near one another and such States would be obliged to send fighter
aircraft to the territory of neighbouring States in order to oblige the aircraft to land. His Delegation
wished to avoid danger to passengers and other innocent persons in the aircraft which might, in this
way, be pursued by military or other classes of aircraft.
"Consequently, the United Kingdom Delegation proposed the deletion of the words 'in or near
whose airspace the aircraft is operated' and the inclusion of the words 'after the aircraft has landed'
after the words 'necessary measures.'
"Mr. Boyle (United States of America) said that he could not agree to the deletion of the words
'in or near whose airspace the aircraft is operated,' nor to the inclusion of an additional phrase
which stated that these measures would be taken only after the aircraft had landed. He stated that
the United States of America was prepared to give every kind of assistance to the aircraft of other
contracting States whether in the air or on the ground.
"Obviously, the United States was not going to violate the airspace of any other country by
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within a territory of a contracting State after being hijacked, the measures
which a State may take to restore control to the lawful aircraft commander
are much more inclusive. Additionally, when this occurs, paragraph 2 imposes upon the contracting State the obligation to permit the passengers
and crew to continue as soon as practicable and to see to it that the aircraft and its cargo are returned to the persons lawfully entitled to possession.
F. Chapter V-Powers And Duties Of States
The Conference, by dividing the Convention into chapters, incorporated
in this Chapter those Articles which specifically impose upon contracting
States particular obligations (to the individual, for example) and also those
provisions which give such States special powers. As a consequence, all
of the provisions which deal with the powers and obligations of States,
including those provisions protecting the civil liberties of individuals,
appear in this Chapter.
Article 12
Any Contracting State shall allow the commander of an aircraft registered
in another Contracting State to disembark any person pursuant to Article 8,
paragraph 1.
This Article is the corollary of Articles 6 and 8. Those Articles authorize
the aircraft commander to disembark any person who has committed, or

is about to commit, an act of the type described in Article 1 of the Convention. It obliges the contracting State to allow the commander of an
aircraft, which is registered in another contracting State, to disembark such
a person. Later provisions of the Convention deal with the consequences
of such disembarkation, but by this Article an unqualified obligation is
imposed on a contracting State to permit disembarkation.
The unqualified nature of this obligation was arrived at by the Conference only after long and careful study of the consequences of such an
undertaking both at Tokyo and in earlier deliberations of the Legal Committee." For example, the status of a disembarked person raised the question of whether he must be "admitted to the territory" of the State in
which he is disembarked. The 1961 Montreal Sub-committee discussed this
question in its report:
"Article 10, paragraph 1

31. The Subcommittee decided to call to the attention of the Legal Committee that it appears from the comments of some States that it might be
desirable to make it clear that the immigration laws of the State in whose
territory a person was disembarked would not be affected by this convention;
also that any right of the State of disembarkation, under its national law,
to require an airline to carry the unwanted passenger away or to pay for
his transportation, would not be affected by the convention.
sending fighter aircraft into that airspace without the permission of the State. Such a thing would

be ridiculous.
"He did not believe that the problems of the United Kingdom were such that they could not be
solved by substituting the words 'appropriate measures' in place of the words 'necessary measures,'
since this substitution would exonerate them from the obligation which they feared to take on."
(Vol. 1, Minutes, Legal Committee ICAO, supra, pp. 155-1S6.)
5
Vol. I, Minutes, Legal Committee of ICAO, 12th Session, Doc. 8111-LC/146-1, pp. 189-197.
Vol. I, Minutes, Legal Committee of ICAO, 14th Session, supra, pp. 133 el seq.
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"Article 10, paragraph 2
32. The Munich draft does not deal with the question as to what arrangements may be made by the State in whose territory a person is disembarked
or delivered by the aircraft commander but the authorities of which State do
not wish to detain him. Comments received from certain States indicated the
desirability of adding in Article 10 a provision to solve this question. Therefore, the Subcommittee recommends that a provision along the following
lines should be included as paragraph 4 in Article 10:
'At the request of the State in whose territory the person is disembarked
or delivered, the State of which he is a national, the State of which he is a
permanent resident and the State in which he began his journey shall be
obliged to admit him into its territory, unless he is a national of, or permanent resident in, the requesting State.'
32.1 While accepting the foregoing, some members wished to expand the
principle along the following lines:
(a) that in addition to the States mentioned, the State of destination of
the passenger disembarked or delivered should also be obliged to accept
him; and
(b) that as amongst the foregoing States, there should be an order of
priority established in regard to the obligation to admit such person."

Ultimately, this problem was solved by the Conference in a manner somewhat contrary to that recommended by the Sub-committee. (See Article
14.)
Article 13
1. Any Contracting State shall take delivery of any person whom the aircraft
commander delivers pursuant to Article 9, paragraph 1.
2. Upon being satisfied that the circumstances so warrant, any Contracting
State shall take custody or other measures to ensure the presence of any
person suspected of an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1 and
of any person of whom it has taken delivery. The custody and other
measures shall be as provided in the law of that State but may only be
continued for such time as is reasonably necessary to enable any criminal
or extradition proceedings to be instituted.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to the previous paragraph shall be assisted
in communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative
of the State of which he is a national.
4. Any Contracting State, to which a person is delivered pursuant to Article
9, paragraph 1, or in whose territory an aircraft lands following the commission of an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1, shall immediately make a preliminary enquiry into the facts.
S. When a State, pursuant to this Article, has taken a person into custody,
it shall immediately notify the State of registration of the aircraft and

the State of nationality of the detained person and, if it considers it
advisable, any other interested State of the fact that such person is in
custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State
which makes the preliminary enquiry contemplated in paragraph 4 of this
Article shall promptly report its findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction.

This Article deals with the obligation of contracting States to take "delivery" of a person from the aircraft commander which should be contrasted with the authority of the aircraft commander to "disembark."
This obligation is the corollary of the authority given the aircraft com-
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mander by Articles 6, 7 and 9. Paragraph 1 states the primary unqualified
obligation of each contracting State to "take delivery."
Paragraph 2 discusses the obligation of a contracting State, after having
taken delivery, to take "custody." It provides that the contracting State
is under obligation to take "custody" only if it is satisfied that the circumstances warrant such action. Thus, the State is left free to judge for
itself whether the act is of such a nature as to warrant such action on its
part and whether it would be consistent with its laws since under paragraph 2 any such custody is to be effected only pursuant to law of the
State taking custody. The Legal Committee in its draft had contemplated
"custody" as the only means of holding any person "delivered," but the
Tokyo Conference added the possibility of "other measures to ensure the
presence" of such a person, presumably referring to bond or other form
of penalty or forfeiture. Additionally, the obligation of the contracting
States to take custody or otherwise ensure the presence of the person in
question is extended beyond the case of the person "delivered" by an
aircraft commander and includes the case of a person suspected of aerial
hijacking.
Paragraph 2 provides that the custody or other measures are to be those
contained in the law of the State taking custody. However, in the case of
custody, it may only be continued for that period of time which is reasonably necessary to enable criminal proceedings to be brought by the State
taking custody, or for extradition proceedings to be instituted by another
interested or affected State.
Paragraph 3 requires any contracting State to assist any person that it
has taken into custody in communicating immediately with the nearest
appropriate representative of his State. This is an important addition to
the Convention which was put forward by the United States for the first
time at the Tokyo Conference. An interesting facet of this provision is
the fact that while at that time-September 1963-no consular agreement
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. had been consummated; nevertheless, neither the U.S.S.R. nor any other of the Soviet bloc countries
present objected to the inclusion of this provision in the Convention.
Paragraph 4 imposes on any contracting State taking "delivery" of a
person, or having a "hijacked" airplane land in its territory, the obligation to make an immediate preliminary enquiry into the facts. This was
the subject of considerable debate at the Tokyo Conference, due primarily
to the fact that the exact legal meaning of the phrase "preliminary enquiry" is not the same in all legal systems of the world. A preliminary
enquiry in some systems envisages a rather formal proceeding presided
over by an officer of the court. In other legal systems it may be a very
informal proceeding conducted by a police officer. Although no exact
agreement as to the meaning of the phrase as used in the Convention was
ever achieved, the provision appears desirable on the theory that some
prompt enquiry, formal or informal, into the circumstances is a desirable
thing in principle and, since a report of the enquiry is required, in most
cases it should operate as a protection to an individual who had been
"delivered" to the authorities of a contracting State.
Paragraph 5 imposes on a State that has taken a person into custody
the obligation to notify the State of registration of the aircraft of that
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fact, and, additionally, where they are different, the State of nationality of
the detained person. Other States may be notified, if the State taking custody considers it advisable. The notification must state the fact of custody
and the reasons therefor. Again, this provision is designed to protect the
individual by calling the situation to the attention of his government.
Also, this provision protects the State of registry of the aircraft by advising it of a problem which its aircraft commander has encountered. The
paragraph additionally imposes upon the State having custody the obligation to report the findings of its preliminary enquiry together with a
statement as to whether it intends to exercise jurisdiction. This latter provision has two purposes: first, to give to the other States more detailed
information as to the circumstances surrounding the entire incident; and,
second, to alert them to the intentions of the holding State so that they
may better form a judgment as to whether they wish to extradite the
individual.
Article 14
1. When any person has been disembarked in accordance with Article 8,
paragraph 1, or delivered in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 1, or has
disembarked after committing an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph
1, and when such person cannot or does not desire to continue his journey
and the State of landing refuses to admit him, that State may, if the person
in question is not a national or permanent resident of that State, return him
to the territory of the State of which he is a national or permanent resident
or to the territory of the State in which he began his journey by air.
2. Neither disembarkation, nor delivery, nor the taking of custody or other
measures contemplated in Article 13, paragraph 2, nor return of the person
concerned, shall be considered as admission to the territory of the Contracting
State concerned for the purpose of its law relating to entry or admission of
persons and nothing in this Convention shall affect the law of a Contracting

State relating to the expulsion of persons from its territory.
This Article deals with the status of an individual who has been "disembarked" or "delivered" pursuant to the provisions of the Convention.
Paragraph 2 states the general rule that neither such disembarkation or
delivery, nor the act of taking custody, is to be considered as "admission
to the territory." (See page 345 supra.) This provision was supported by
the United States, among others, both at the Tokyo Conference and earlier
in the Legal Committee. The fact that the Convention imposes upon contracting States obligations which enable an individual to be physically
present within the confines of the State makes it necessary to specifically
provide that these obligations are in no way intended to affect "admission"
to the territory of the State in the normal sense of the word.
On the other hand, the United States opposed the inclusion of Paragraph 1 of Article 14. This Article provides that, in the case of a person
"disembarked" or "delivered," if the person cannot or does not desire to
continue his journey and the State of landing refuses to admit him to its
territory, then that State is given the authority to return such a person
if he is not a national or resident to another State. In effect, this is a form
of expulsion. It was opposed on the ground that the situation contemplated in the Article was one that quite often arose when persons whom
a State did not wish to "admit" arrived in its territory by some form of
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transportation. In the case of surface transportation no special international rule existed and there appeared to be no reason why air travel
should be treated differently. Moreover, national laws appeared to be
sufficient to cope with this problem in the case of surface travel, and there
appeared no reason why they could not adequately deal with the problem
posed by the Convention with respect to air travel. These arguments,
however, were unavailing, and the Conference adopted the provision of
paragraph 1 over the objections of the United States and other States.
Article 15
1. Without prejudice to Article 14, any person who has been disembarked
in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 1, or delivered in accordance with
Article 9, paragraph 1, or has disembarked after committing an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1, and who desires to continue his journey
shall be at liberty as soon as practicable to proceed to any destination of his
choice unless his presence is required by the law of the State of landing for
the purpose of extradition or criminal proceedings.
2. Without prejudice to its law as to entry and admission to, and extradition
and expulsion from its territory, a Contracting State in whose territory a
person has been disembarked in accordance with Article 8, paragraph 1, or
delivered in accordance with Article 9, paragraph 1, or has disembarked and
is suspected of having committed an act contemplated in Article 11, paragraph 1, shall accord to such person treatment which is no less favourable
for his protection and security than that accorded to nationals of such Contracting State in like circumstances.

Article 15 is designed to assure the individuals who may be subjected to
"disembarkation" or "delivery" under the Convention additional guarantees as to their civil liberties. Paragraph 1 provides that any person who
has been disembarked or delivered is to be set at liberty as soon as practicable in order to proceed to any destination of his choice, except in the
case where the law of the State of landing requires him to remain for the
purpose of extradition or criminal proceedings. Paragraph 2 provides that
any person delivered or disembarked must be accorded by the law of that
State treatment which is no less favorable for his protection and security
than that accorded to nationals of that State under like circumstances.
By this formulation it is intended that persons in any form of custody or
otherwise subject to the law of contracting States should be entitled to
avail themselves of the provisions of law of that State relating to the protection of nationals. In the United States, for example, this would include
the writ of Habeas Corpus, the privilege against self-incrimination, protection against search and seizure, etc. These provisions were introduced
and advocated by the United States delegation to the Conference.
G. Chapter VI-Other Provisions
Article 16
1. Offences committed on aircraft registered in a Contracting State shall
be treated, for the purpose of extradition, as if they had been committed
only in the place in which they have occurred but also in the territory of
the State of registration of the aircraft.
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of the preceding paragraph, nothing

in this Convention shall be deemed to create an obligation to grant extradition.
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As previously stated in Part III of this paper, the Legal Committee decided not to formulate any form of priority system between competing
jurisdictions, but to provide for concurrency of criminal jurisdictions. In
certain cases, extradition treaties can be helpful in avoiding the consequences of conflicts between competing jurisdictions. This, indeed, is
normal international practice where an extradition treaty is in force between two competing jurisdictions, or between the State which is holding
the alleged offender and other States, all of which claim jurisdiction over
him. The Legal Committee considered the use of extradition treaties to
be a feasible partial solution to problems of conflict of jurisdictions in the
case of crimes committed on aircraft. However, such a solution requires
that extradition treaties be made applicable to events which occur on aircraft. Since most extradition treaties refer to crimes committed within the
territory of a State, it is necessary to specify that crimes committed on
board aircraft are to be treated as though they have been committed within
the territory of a State. This relatively simple concept had caused a great

deal of difficulty within the Legal Committee either because it was not
clearly understood or because of difficulties in expressing it in three different languages. In any event, at the Conference, the formula found in
paragraph 1 of Article 16 was suggested by the Conference Drafting

Committee and the difficulties were resolved.
Paragraph 2 provides that the Convention itself is not to be considered
as creating an obligation to grant extradition, except to the extent that

paragraph 1 of Article 16 may be so considered. This provision, as indicated, is a corollary to the fundamental decision in the Legal Committee,
as adopted by the Conference, that the Convention itself does not grant
any priority of jurisdictions, and for that reason it is not intended to in
any way create an independent obligation to grant extradition.
Article 17
In taking any measures for investigation or arrest or otherwise exercising
jurisdiction in connection with any offence committed on board an aircraft
the Contracting States shall pay due regard to the safety and other interests
of air navigation and shall so act as to avoid unnecessary delay of the aircraft,
passengers, crew or cargo.
This Article is self-explanatory. It imposes upon the contracting States
the obligation of utilizing the powers granted by the Convention in such
a way as not to jeopardize safety or other interests of air navigation and
to avoid unnecessary delay to the aircraft, passengers, crew and cargo.
Even though the language of the Article is precatory in nature, it is
nevertheless in keeping with the spirit of the Convention and therefore
useful.
Article 18
If Contracting States establish joint air transport operating organizations or
international operating agencies, which operate aircraft not registered in any
one State those States shall, according to the circumstances of the case,
designate the State among them which, for the purposes of this Convention,
shall be considered as the State of registration and shall give notice thereof
to the International Civil Aviation Organization which shall communicate
the notice to all States Parties to this Convention.
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This Article deals with a specific problem which the Conference found
to be very troublesome. As provided in Article 3, the theory of the Convention is that the State of registration of the aircraft has jurisdiction over
offenses and acts committed on board, and under the provisions of Chapter III, the aircraft commander has certain powers derived from the laws
of the State of registration. Thus this Article attempts to solve the problem which aircraft of a consortium would present, if such aircraft were
not registered in any State or registered in more than one. In the situation
thus envisaged it would be difficult to apply the Convention. The Article
meets this difficulty by providing that the States forming the consortium
should designate the State among them, which, for the purposes of the
Convention, is to be considered as the State of registration. Presumably,
this could mean any State in the consortium that is a contracting State,
even though it might not be one of the States in which the aircraft was
registered.
Whether this provision is desirable is open to question. It is probably
unnecessary since, as a practicable matter, any aircraft being operated by
a consortium of contracting States normally could be registered in one
such State."' Additionally, this Article appears to be directed to a specific
method of forming a consortium; there may be other methods which
might present other problems left unsolved by this Article. The provision
was strongly supported by a number of the recently independent African
States that may be contemplating joint airline operations. While it may
not be wholly desirable, its inclusion in the Convention does not appear
to present any major difficulty.
H. Chapter VII-Final Clauses
Since the provisions of this Chapter are for the most part formal and
contain no substantive provisions relating to the technical problems of
aviation law, an article-by-article discussion is unnecessary. Nevertheless,
some comment is warranted.
Articles 19 and 22 limit adherence to the Convention to those States
which are members of the United Nations or of any of its specialized
agencies. This provision was the subject of considerable debate both within
the Committee on Final Clauses and in the plenary meetings of the Tokyo
Conference. It necessarily excludes from the possibility of signing, ratifying or adhering to the Convention the so-called unrecognized regimes
such as the People's Republic of China. From a political standpoint, this
clause is a desirable one for the United States. It was, of course, resisted
by the U.S.S.R. and other bloc countries on the ground that it excluded
some States from becoming party to the Convention.
Additionally, this Chapter designates the International Civil Aviation
Organization as the depository of instruments of ratification and provides
that the Convention is to come into effect as soon as twelve of the signatory States have ratified the Convention.
" Scandinavian Airlines System is a consortium of the nationalized air transport organizations
of Denmark, Norway and Sweden; however, each of its aircraft is registered in one of the three
States.
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V. CONCLUSION

The Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed
on Board Aircraft is, like all legislation not divinely given, imperfect. It is
confined to a narrow range of human activity, and, even within this
range, its specific terms are the result of compromises among sovereign
States. Such compromises were necessary to achieve subsequent ratification
by a large number of States with important aviation interests; but, at the
same time, the provisions thus developed probably do not constitute an
ideal formulation from the point of view of any one State. Beginning as
a conceptually grand design to study, and perhaps codify in international
law, "the legal status of the aircraft," the project was successively narrowed in scope, and as the draft convention was evolved and its provisions
were ever more closely defined, limitations on its scope were necessitated
in order to achieve an accommodation of views. Thus, the simple solution
of a priority system in which the State of first landing would have primary (and almost exclusive) jurisdiction could not find acceptance among
a majority of ICAO Member States. At the opposite pole, the attractive
concept of limiting the scope of the Convention to crimes or acts which
do or may jeopardize the safety of the aircraft failed of adoption. Nevertheless, a good balance was struck between what could be done and what
needed to be done. In this sense, the Tokyo Convention is a desirable and
necessary addition to international air law.
As has been indicated, the Convention does not in all respects coincide
exactly with the legal system and philosophy of the United States; but
because its deviations therefrom are not significant we believe that, on
the whole, the document can be said to be in accord with United States
legal doctrine. For example, the Convention probably would be better
if the jurisdictional articles had been confined to those acts or crimes
which, when committed on board aircraft, were of such a nature that they
would adversely affect the safety of persons or property on board the aircraft, or the aircraft itself. As we have seen, the Tokyo Conference rejected
this concept; however, in so doing, it limited the otherwise unlimited
sweep of the jurisdictional articles by adopting Article 2 which removed
from the ambit of the Convention those offenses which are of a political,
racial, or religious nature.
Those provisions of Chapter V which are designed to protect the civil
liberties of persons "disembarked," "delivered," or in custody are primarily the result of Anglo-American legal doctrine. This is not to say
that these were resisted by those nations present at the Tokyo Conference
whose legal systems are based on different traditions, but to emphasize
that it was the Anglo-American legal philosophy which initiated the expression of these protections in the text of the Convention.
There are other important provisions of the Convention which coincide
with the political and legal views of the United States. The concept that
contracting States are free to decide the extent to which, and manner in
which, they will exercise the jurisdiction conferred by the Convention
with respect to acts occurring on board their aircraft is, as earlier shown,
a theory advanced by the United States. Those provisions of Chapter III
which describe the powers and duties of the aircraft commander in such
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a way as to minimize his role as a policeman are consistent with the aviation regulatory concepts prevailing in the United States. Articles 11 and
16, dealing respectively with hijacking and extradition, were advocated by
the United States.
It is our conclusion that the Tokyo Convention has resolved most major
issues in accordance with the political and legal policies and traditions of
the United States. At the same time the views of other States have been
accommodated. An area of international relations has thus been regulated
in a manner not inconsistent with the law and practice of the world
community of nations. Early ratification of the Convention by the United
States and all of the States which participated in the Tokyo Conference
would therefore be in the best interest of international aviation.

